REAGANISM IS NOT CLOUDY – November 7, 2008

There has been some buzz in the blogosphere after my last op-ed for the Central Europe Digest in which I argued that John McCain’s presidency would be better for Central Europe than that of Barack Obama’s. Mr. Adrian J. Erlinger, the Editor of the Leopolis Blog (to which I am now linking from the EuropeanCourier.org’s site), labeled my argumentation a “cloudy vision for Central Europe”.

The purpose of my op-ed for the Central Europe Digest was not to sketch any particular vision for the region (or more particularly for Poland), but to explain why John McCain was a safer and better choice. However, because Mr. Erlinger put my “lack of vision” at issue, I feel compelled to address his concerns in this op-ed and explain in more detail my position.

POLISH DIASPORA

Mr. Erlinger argues that Polish diaspora in the U.S. weighs very little influence these days as compared to the 80’s and the 90’s, therefore its position is not relevant. He points out, that the biggest Polish diaspora lives presently in England and Ireland, and not the U.S., and for that reason it cannot relate to Reaganism. In his opinion, Poland is moving closer to the EU as it joined the Schengen group and is looking to adopt euro as its currency. As a result, Tusk’s Reaganism is not producing support for the U.S. policies.

That’s not the case. The problem of limited influence of Polish diaspora in the U.S. was perhaps best explained in the last book by Samuel Huntington: “Who are we?” The author introduced empirical data showing that, historically, Poles have been among one of the fastest assimilating minorities in America. There are several reasons for that, but for the purpose of our discussion it is sufficient to say that the overwhelming majority of second generation Polish immigrants deem themselves Americans, rather than Poles, and marry outside of their ethnic group. Naturally, it diminishes their capacity as a closed lobbying group, but on the other hand increases their direct participation in the U.S. domestic politics, what enables them to influence America’s policies from that standpoint. As an example, one may point out to the Brzezinskis family, but there are other examples as well. For instance, Edward Muskie, who was the U.S. Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and a Democratic presidential contender in 1972, was a second generation Polish immigrant. Currently serving Senator Barbara Mikulski is of Polish descent. Additionally, Sen. Lisa Murkowski and her father Frank Murkowski (former Governor of Alaska) are Polish Americans as well. One may disagree, what is more important for ethnic minorities in terms of their political influence, whether to have strong lobbying capacities (like for example the Armenians in the U.S. do) or perhaps to have direct representation in the U.S. government and politics (like the Polish Americans have had). As far as I know, Polish diaspora in England and Ireland has not, so far, produced any first tier domestic politicians, who would have significant influence on policies of the United Kingdom or Ireland. It is not, however, to say that it will not do so in the future. It is just to argue that Polish diaspora in England and Ireland is, and for a considerable period of time will be, significantly less influential in those two countries, than the Polish diaspora in the U.S. has been.

Secondly, what I meant by reference to Reaganism was not merely a relation to history. It is undisputed that presently the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice Party in Poland enjoy support of roughly 70-75% of the society. Polish society itself has considerably turned to conservatism; a one that is basically structured on the premises of Reaganism. While the Polish diaspora in England predominantly votes for the Civic Platform (whose leader openly admires Reagan), and the Polish diaspora in America votes for the Law and Justice Party (which leaders refer to Reagan’s policies), all of them cast votes for conservative ideologies, although they may differ in nuances. As far as we know, it does not resonate with Obama’s ideas, visions and political beliefs, which I questioned.

Thirdly, Poland’s membership in the European Union, the Schengen group or its endeavors to join the euro-zone are merely pragmatic, rather than ideological. It is not a requirement for a membership in the EU, the Schengen group etc., to be a socialism-leaning country or a country with a leftist government, which rejects support for the U.S. policies. The atlanticist countries are free to join the Schengen group or the euro-zone as well. In other words, one does not need to give up conservatism (Reaganism) to be admitted. Therefore, I do not see any link between the Tusk Administration’s efforts to get integrated closer within the EU and any alleged rejection of support for the U.S. policies. Poland’s support for the U.S. transcends Tusk’s or Kaczynski’s admiration for Ronald Reagan’s policies to the extent that it is a conscious political decision to pursue a specific strategic option, which is believed to be the best for Poland under present geopolitical circumstances. There has been consensus about that in Poland for years regardless whether the power was exercised by the leftist government of Leszek Miller (who strongly backed the U.S. intervention in Iraq) or by the rightist governments of Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Donald Tusk (who both have been supporting the idea to locate the U.S. antimissile shield in Poland). This strategic option has been pursued even in the absence of present-day tangible benefits for Poland (as we know, the U.S. has not waived visa requirements for Poles or helped Polish companies to get profitable business contracts in the reconstruction of Iraq or an access to its oil fields).

RUSSIA, MEAT-WARS AND KATYN

Mr. Erlinger argues that “President Kaczynski's policies toward Russia may have scored points with the ‘mohair berets’ at home in 2005, but ultimately failed in the EU and abroad. Initiatives such as the "energy NATO," historical recognition over Katyn, "meat wars," and Germanophobia not only isolated Warsaw from Eurocrats in Brussels, but earned Poland zero leverage vis-a-vis a resurgent Russia”.

Those arguments are easy to rebut. In my opinion, President Kaczynski’s policies toward Russia have not failed. Kaczynski and Valdas Adamkus are de facto proposing a different approach toward Russia than the one which has been pursued, so far, by the Western Europe and successive U.S. governments. The policy of engagement and incorporation of Russia into multilateral institutions was started when Bill Clinton came to office in 1992. The rationale behind it was to make Russia a more predictable power, to gain leverage on its policies and to induce democratic processes in the country. The policy has been faithfully followed by George W. Bush, Angela Merkel, and recently Nicolas Sarkozy. However this approach has been grossly ineffective. It did not take into consideration Russian historical predicaments, psychology, confrontational mentality and political realities. The result achieved was the opposite of that intended: (a) the regress of democracy (as we speak, right now, the Russian Duma is contemplating the amendment of the Constitution to enable Vladimir Putin’s comeback to power as a President next year), (b) massive violations of human and civil rights, (c) political persecution and incarceration of critics of Kremlin or supporters of opposition parties (usually businesspeople, who are jailed and their businesses are nationalized). More importantly though, the policies of engagement, together with other indispensable factors, set a convenient environment for rebirth of Russia’s historic revisionism and politics of aggression, what was evidenced by its invasion of Georgia in August. Therefore it may seem quite reasonable to turn to solutions which proved successful toward the Soviet Union in the past, and here is where Ronald Reagan’s hawkish ideology comes into play. Both, Kaczynski and Adamkus, understand this issue in that particular way. John McCain and the Republican Party apparently share their opinion, as it was many times confirmed by John McCain on the campaign trail. Needless to say, Barack Obama has no specific approach toward Russia formulated and is unlikely to pay much attention to what’s going on in Central Europe. 

Now, we turn to the issue of Poland’s leverage on Russia. I disagree with Mr. Erlinger on that as well. In my view, Russia exhibits typical characteristics of a disruptive power and will try to further its influence through disruption of peace and security in the region, to the extent it is allowed to do so. One may stop a disruptive power by objection to its actions – not by diplomatic or economic seduction. In this context, Poland showed substantial leverage on Russia on the issue of politically-motivated ban of Polish meat exports into the Russian market. The Jaroslaw Kaczynski Administration responded with a veto over a new EU-Russia partnership agreement. The result was that the ban was swiftly lifted as soon as the Tusk Administration took office (undoubtedly, it could not have been lifted before that, as Russia had to somehow save its face). The result of the Kaczynski’s approach showed that it was an effective way of dealing with Russia as compared to previously undertaken diplomatic and “engaging” efforts by the European Commission, which achieved virtually nothing in the subject matter. The policy of engagement produces no fruit in relation to Russia.

Mr. Erlinger also mentions the Katyn massacre and that seeking its historical recognition spoils relations with Russia. I strongly disagree on that. It is not Poland’s pursuit of historical recognition of the Katyn massacre, which spoils the relations with Russia – it is the fact that the massacre took place, what spoiled Russia’s relations with the Poles in the first place. I do not subscribe to the notion that the victims of genocide should keep quiet and not seek justice for themselves because it may damage their relations with the oppressors. Following such way of thinking, we should shut down the Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in the Hague (because it spoils relations between Bosnian Muslims and Serbian Orthodox Christians), or shut down the Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha (because it spoils relations between Hutu and Tutsi). To stop demanding justice for the Katyn victims as a requirement for improving Polish-Russian relations is an empty argument. The opposite is true. We need to discuss the issue thoroughly. Russians need to compensate the victims’ families so that a reconciliation process may follow, compared to the one between the Poles and the Germans. It is a requirement sine qua non of improving Poland-Russia relations and mutual understanding. Russia cannot – as also modern Germany could not – hide from its own history. However, it is up to Russia to make a proper move.

Mr. Erlinger’s argument that Poland should not be proposing that NATO, among its other goals, be an “energy alliance” is somewhat curious. This proposition is supported not only by Poland but by many American politicians, including Sen. Richard Lugar, with whom Barack Obama worked very closely on the energy issues and nuclear non-proliferation. Sen. Lugar is now being seriously considered for a position in the Obama Administration. It would be definitely beneficial for NATO if it paid more attention to the energy security of its own member-states. No doubt about that.

Lastly, it is not true what Mr. Erlinger says about Polish society’s support for the U.S. anti-missile shield. The polls he cites are outdated and no longer holding. A poll conducted by Rzeczpospolita on August 20 (this is after Russia’s invasion of Georgia), showed that as much as 60% of the society presently supports the antimissile shield.

Sebastian Aulich