RUSSIAN REVANCHISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF GEORGIAN BLITZKRIEG

- December 5, 2008

PREFACE

In the wake of the August 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia, it is becoming clear that the rule of force is relapsing in the post-Soviet area. Having withdrawn

from the Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007,

Russia is militarizing the Caucasus and its European frontiers, disregarding Western efforts to bring it back

to the treaty regime. Russia is building airbases along

the border with Ukraine, modernizing its nuclear submarine fleet, and placing long-range missiles in the Caucasus, Belarus and Kaliningrad [Kenigsberg] on the Baltic Sea. Ramifications of this Russian revanchism caught many in the West by surprise. But one has to understand that Moscow is not simply falling back into

its “unpredictable” and “traditionally aggressive” international behavior, let alone the “imperial ambitions:” there are essential reasons for Russia’s revanchism. I will try to explain it here from the Russian point of view, which is less known in the West, and in the words of Russian officials and ideologues themselves, for neglecting their attitude and analyzing their policy by Western standards makes Russia unpredictable for the West.

BLITZKRIEG IN GEORGIA AND CONTINGENCIES FOR POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS

The Kremlin has a concept of Greater Caucasus (comprising Russia’s North Caucasus and the three independent republics of South Caucasus) as an interconnected region. Historically, the Russian Empire established its dominion over Transcaucasia in order to pacify the restless tribes of North Caucasus. Russia’s ability to control Transcaucasia has always been perceived as a key element for maintaining stability in its restive Caucasian provinces on both sides of the Caucasus Range. The establishment of NATO’s foothold in Georgia could spark a domino effect across the Caucasus and culminate in losing control over the South Caucasus, with grave consequences for Russia’s volatile North Caucasus autonomies. The two Chechen wars of 1994-1996 and 1999-2000 gave us a perfect example.

Ossetians are an Iranic-speaking people whose ethnogenesis lies in the steppes of the Don River [Alania] to the north of the Caucasus. In the 13th century they were driven by the Mongolo-Tartar invaders out of their original homeland into the Caucasus mountains and settled in the territories known today as North Ossetia-Alania (part of Russia) and South Ossetia (part of Georgia) on both sides of the Greater Caucasus Range. Georgians (as well as the Abkhaz) are an autochthonous Caucasian nation and have always lived beyond these mountains in the valleys between the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges.

Ossetians and Georgians have a long and complex history of coexistence interspersed with violence. During the Russian Civil War after the 1917 October Revolution hostilities betided in 1918–1920 between the Georgians and Ossetians, along with other Caucasian conflicts. With the creation of the USSR in 1922, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region [Oblast] was formed inside the Georgian SSR, while the Northern Ossetia remained within the RSFSR as an autonomous republic (ASSR). Most Ossetians believe that the decision to split Ossetia and leave its southern part within Georgia was due to the dual origin of Stalin himself, who was born in Gori (a Georgian town just outside of South Ossetia) to an Ossetian father and a Georgian mother.

In 1990, as the USSR was crumbling and the longtime Soviet dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was emerging as Georgia’s first independent leader, he promulgated a nationalist platform, dubbed “Georgia for the Georgians,” to the debasement of Ossetians (and other minorities, such as Azeris and Armenians) as newcomers to Georgia, and urged them to leave Georgia and return to their homelands. Unsurprisingly, soon a military conflict broke out in January 1991, when Georgian militants entered South Ossetia, killing more than 2000 people. The war ended with the 1992 cease-fire, when South Ossetia broke away from Georgia and Russian peacekeepers were stationed there.

The conflict remained frozen until 2003, when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Tbilisi in the wake of Rose Revolution which ousted president Eduard Shevardnadze. Saakashvili’s government strengthened the failing state institutions of Georgia, including the military. Restoring South Ossetia and Abkhazia (which also broke away in 1992) to Georgian control has been Saakashvili’s supreme goal since he came to power. South Ossetia conducted an independence referendum in 2006 and proclaimed a de facto independence from Georgia.

On 8 August 2008 (when the world’s attention was riveted on the opening ceremony of Beijing Olympics), after a massive and indiscriminate artillery and missile barrage that lasted all night, Georgia launched a ground and air attack on South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali. Russia responded by sending troops into South Ossetia and bombing targets further inside Georgia proper. One day later Russian and Abkhazian forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge, held by the Georgians in Abkhazia, and intruding into western parts of Georgia’s interior. Russia instituted a naval blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea coast. Almost all Georgian vessels were scuttled by Russian warships at their Poti naval base. After five days of heavy fighting, Georgian forces were ejected from South Ossetia and Russian troops invaded Georgia proper, occupying the cities of Poti and Gori among others.

Following the mediation by French president Nicolas Sarkozy, a cease-fire agreement was signed by Georgia and Russia on 15 August in Tbilisi and 16 August in Moscow. By terms of the agreement, Russia pulled most of its troops from Georgia proper by 1 October 2008 and the European Union monitors were deployed in the conflict zone. Russian troops remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the areas that were under Georgian control before the war. The sixth and final point of the cease-fire agreement called for internationally mediated talks between Georgia and Russia on security guarantees for the two republics. The talks, however, broke down at their opening session in Geneva on 15 October 2008 as Georgian officials were categorically against inviting the two breakaway republics to participate.

The Russian government has long highlighted the similarities between Kosovo and South Ossetia. When Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, Putin argued that this would embolden South Ossetia, as well as other separatist regions in the post-Soviet area, such as Abkhazia, Pridnestrovie and Nagorno-Karabakh. Since August 2008 parallels have also been drawn between Russia’s military actions in Georgia and NATO’s bombing campaign in Serbia during the Kosovo conflict of 1998-1999.

The analogy of South Ossetia to Kosovo is especially convincing if we take into account the adjoining republics of Albania and Alania (North Ossetia), where their ethnic kin enjoy a national statehood, and consider them as divided nations striving for reunification. If NATO’s military action against Serbia for separation of Kosovo was good, why then Russia’s military action against Georgia for separation of South Ossetia was bad? And why, in the case of Kosovo, the West has recognized its independence but, in the case of South Ossetia, its independence is not considered legitimate?

Therefore, the new Russian president Medvedev signed decrees on 26 August 2008 recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The statement based his arguments on the referenda and appeals by regional assemblies to Moscow to recognize the state sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s State Duma voted in support of those appeals. So far, only Nicaragua, led by its Marxist president Daniel Ortega, has recognized their independence, despite the diplomatic drive by Russia to persuade its allies to grant them recognition.

Medvedev’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states is unlikely to constitute the final word on the status of either. South Ossetia, in particular, has virtually no chance of surviving as a viable statelet without joining its northern kin, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, which is a subject of the Russian Federation. In contrast, the Abkhazian Republic has an economic potential for developing both agriculture and tourism, and has a sizable diaspora in Turkey that could provide the needed investment in addition to the already established Russian tourism industry. The Russian constitution provides for admitting new territorial entities with the mutual consent of both parties. Moreover, most of the population in both republics already hold Russian passports.

South Ossetia is almost certainly likely to be subsumed into the Russian Federation. Its president, Eduard Kokoity, has proclaimed that “the primary aim of South Ossetia is unification with North Ossetia within the composition of Russia. We have never made any secret of this.” North Ossetian president, Teimuraz Mamsurov, too has described reunification of the Ossetian nation within a single territorial entity as righting an historic injustice. After meeting with Medvedev on 11 September 2008 in the Russian resort of Sochi on the Black Sea, Kokoity told reporters: “Yes, we will be part of the Russian Federation. We will do so according to all the norms of international law. Now we are an independent state and we look forward to uniting with North Ossetia and joining the Russia Federation.”

Incorporating of Abkhazia would pose a greater problem for Moscow as its president, Sergey Bagapsh, has staked his reputation on independence for Abkhazia and began to issue its own Abkhaz passports. While much attention has been paid to the South Ossetian front, less notice was taken of the actions in and around Abkhazia, which seized the opportunity and opened a second front against Georgia, retaking the Kodori Gorge -- the last part of Abkhazia still held by the Georgian military since the expulsion of Georgian authorities during the ethnic conflict of 1992-1993. With Russian support, Abkhaz forces dislodged the Georgian detachments from the Kodori Gorge by 12 August 2008. Following the Kodori operation, Abkhaz authorities announced a unilateral decision to extend the boundaries of Abkhazia to the Inguri River, which they claim is their traditional and natural border with Georgia. This demarcation encompasses even a portion of Georgia’s Zugdidi district, as well as the Inguri hydroelectric power plant.

On 17 September 2008 Medvedev signed treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia that committed Moscow to defend these breakaway regions from any Georgian assault. The treaties also formalized their economic cooperation: both republics already receive substantial economic support from the Russian government and the Russian ruble is their local currency. Consequently, Russia announced a plan to station 7600 troops in the two regions (3800 men in each republic), more than twice the number based there before the Ossetian war. Before fighting broke out in August 2008, Russia had a peacekeeping force of 1000 servicemen in South Ossetia and a contingent of 2500 in Abkhazia. They were operating under a peacekeeping mandate dating back to the 1990s.

The Georgian war and recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence raised fears among former Soviet republics that Russia might also intervene in other separatist conflicts, particularly in Pridnestrovie [Transdniester], wedged between Moldova and Ukraine along the banks of the Dnestr River, and Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan. Medvedev himself has been quick to draw parallels with the frozen conflicts simmering in the post-Soviet space at the meeting with his Moldovan counterpart, Vladimir Voronin, on 25 August 2008 in Sochi, in a tacit warning against any attempt by Moldova to retake Pridnestrovie by force. “This is a serious warning, a warning to all,” he added, “and I believe we should handle other existing conflicts in this context.”

Pridnestrovie has the oldest record of separatism among the post-Soviet entities: it broke away from the Moldovan SSR in 1990, even before the breakup of the USSR, and gained a de facto independence as the result of a short separatist war in 1992, when Russia sent peacekeepers there to protect Pridnestrovie against the Moldovan assaults. The South Ossetian conflict sparked fears in Moldova that Moscow could now move to recognize the independence of Pridnestrovie whose Russian population has long been pushing for integration with Russia. Most of Moldova’s major industries are concentrated in this region.

The eastward expansion of NATO has given this province a new strategic importance, since it borders Ukraine which, like Georgia, has angered Moscow by seeking a NATO membership. Medvedev’s decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia has certainly raised hopes of independence in Pridnestrovie and radicalized the stance of its separatist leadership which announced it was breaking off all contacts with Moldovan officials until they denounced “Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia.”

In these circumstances, Medvedev met on 3 September 2008 in Sochi with Pridnestrovie’s separatist leader Igor Smirnov. Mr.Smirnov, whose region depends on political and economic support from Russia, said after the talk that he was ready for a compromise. His remarks contrasted with the pre-war statements by leaders of Georgia’s separatist regions who had vowed to accept nothing less than full independence and refused to discuss any other options with Tbilisi. Moldova has rejected an earlier compromise, drafted by Moscow in 2003, under which Pridnestrovie would re-integrate into the country but enjoy broad autonomy and a Russian guarantee that it could leave the agreement should Moldovans decide to merge with their ethnic kin in the EU member Romania in a reunited state as both countries are populated by the same nation.

Despite his conciliatory tone in Sochi, Voronin is still reluctant to accept a Russian-brokered deal that would grant Pridnestrovie broad autonomy -- a move that could hurt the popularity of his Communist Party ahead of the 2009 parliamentary elections. He rejected a similar deal in 2003 under a strong pressure from NATO. But now Voronin appears to treat the Russian mediation more favorably. Let us leave this issue for now, while Medvedev is trying to forge a deal that would keep the rebel region as an autonomous part of Moldova, and turn to another separatist conflict.

Nagorno-Karabakh, which is home to Armenians but lies within the titular boundaries of the former Azerbaijan SSR, differs from other ethnic conflicts. Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Pridnestrovie, the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh do not hold Russian passports and do not seek a Russian patronage. Rather, their goal is reintegration with Armenia. Officials in both Baku and Erevan have been notably muted on Russia’s actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Azerbaijan is eager to regain control over the disputed territory and has steadily built up its military, thanks to the windfall of petrodollars, in an implicit threat to retake the region by force. But Azeri officials have avoided any harsh statements on the Russian intervention in Georgia, wary of annoying Moscow.

Armenia, which maintains far stronger ties with Russia, has been slow to take sides in the Russia-Georgia conflict. Russia helped Armenian forces in the Karabakh war of 1988-1993 and has a military base in Armenia. Due to the joint Azeri-Turkish economic blockade, this landlocked country depends heavily on neighboring Georgia, through which the bulk of its imports, including Russian oil and gas, transits. Siding with Russia and setting a collision course with Tbilisi could also prove disastrous for the half-million ethnic Armenians presently living in Georgia. (Half a million Azeris live in Georgia too).

Medvedev’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is nonetheless bound to affect the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh since Russia, together with the USA and France, co-chairs the Minsk Group, a body created by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to foster a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Nevertheless, a quick resolution of this conflict is not on the cards in the present state of affairs.

Dr. Alec Rasizade

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Dr. Alec Rasizade holds Ph.D. degree in Modern History from Moscow State University and M.A. degree from Azerbaijan State University. He is presently a Senior Associate at the Historical Research Center in Washington, D.C. Dr. Rasizade used to be a lecturer at many universities, including Stanford University and Columbia University. Prior to that he worked at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

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