BRCKO POKER - March 17, 2009

  
During the Dayton negotiations, the status of Brcko became the final issue upon which Bosnia & Herzegovina would be saved or lost. It was critical enough for

the future of the country that the delegation of BiH, (including then President

Alija Izetbegovic, PM Haris Silajdzic, Miro Lazovic, Ivo Komsic, Kresimir Zubak and I), was willing to risk the Dayton Accords as a whole. Brcko was played out like a poker game and in the outcome the whole of BiH won. Now, Brcko District has again become the fulcrum for the future of BiH. The bluff and bluster of today are in quality no different from 13 years earlier, and the future status of Brcko is no less decisive in defining the survival of BiH.
   
MILOSEVIC PUTS HIS FINAL DEMANDS ON TABLE IN DAYTON
  

Slobodan Milosevic, (then President of Serbia and negotiating on behalf of Belgrade and its derivative in BiH Republika Srpska), was insistent that BiH's genocide case before  the ICJ be dropped and that Brcko be part of the newly defined Republika Srpska. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, as leading negotiator, was effectively siding with the Serbian delegation, having worn down Croatian President Tudjman and implicitly adopted the strategy that Milosevic had to be placated to achieve an agreement. We were told that if we did not agree to Brcko being incorporated into Republika Srpska, the talks would be deemed a failure and that we would be declared at fault. I'm not certain if President Izetbegovic and the other members of the BiH delegation would have finally risked continued war, genocide and potential US Administration ire, but we held to the position that Brcko would not be sacrificed to Republika Srpska and Milosevic.
  
WHY IS BRCKO DISTRICT IMPORTANT?
   

Brcko is geographically pivotal. It is the intersection of territories controlled by Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH, and as such was the focus of strategically critical fighting in 1992-1995. However, the significance is more than geographic.
  
During the Dayton talks, the Serbian delegation under Milosevic's leadership tried to consistently move the discussion from the qualitative factors defining the BiH state to those focused on territorial delineation. Unfortunately, Ambassador Holbrooke fell into this strategy, at least due to expediency. It was my view that the Government of BiH delegation was too obliging, perhaps out of too much trust, the desire to see a conclusion to a war and genocide that had already taken so much from BiH and its people, or both. (Here, Dr. Silajdzic and I particularly kept refocusing attention on the methodology, functionality and nature of the open, democratic society of the BiH state as a whole and the decisive importance of refugee return and reintegration, but unfortunately with only limited results).
   
WHY NOT NEAT DELINEATION AND A CLEAN MAP
   

While neat delineation might look more orderly and manageable on a new internal map of BiH, I understood that in the longer term interests of BiH, the map had to also encourage interaction between regions and people and thus gradual reintegration. The ethnic map of BiH reflected many shades historically, and this war was an effort at homogenization. Why should the new internal map of BiH look like a neat surgical cut rather than what it was in actuality, the slash of a crude butcher's cleaver through a truly multi-ethnic, integrated society. Ethnic cleansing had not been neat and part of the healing process would be to encourage re cohesion through the new map rather than further ethnic separation.
   
Milosevic, Mladic and Karadzic had already seized and eliminated Srebrenica and Zepa, (what I would come to discover as acquiescence from some of those who were mediators in Dayton), in order to make for more contiguous, "cleaner," boundaries for Republika Srpska. As the talks began in Dayton, Sarajevo was envisioned as a reintegrating catalyst for BiH  as it was to be designated into a special capital district, not belonging to either entity. However, Milosevic understood this as the danger to his longer term scheme of furthering BiH's division and realizing the defacto Greater Serbia. Milosevic was willing to negotiate away Sarajevo for what appeared as minimal territorial demands elsewhere in order to marginalize the capital's potential as a reintegrating catalyst for all of BiH. (Milosevic had revealed his objectives going into Dayton for a Greater Serbia by continuing to posture for a "referendum" for Republika Srpska that would legitimize secession from BiH sometime into the future, 5 years or so).
   
PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC COULD NOT GIVE AWAY BRCKO
  

It had been three weeks since the Dayton discussions had begun. Holbrooke had become anxious, perhaps disoriented by his eagerness as he pressed for a deal, any deal. General Wes Clark maintained his wits and outward calm as he passed around various "map" options. However, by then most of the focus was on Brcko. It was an all out press upon the delegation of BiH to accede to a fate for Brcko within RS. Our delegation resisted, but the pressure was persistent and it was perhaps difficult to see how in the end we would prevail.
  
President Izetbegovic proposed we take a walk around the large airbase. Our rooms and meetings were undoubtedly monitored. The walk would be an opportunity for a conversation that at least had a better chance of not being overheard.
  
Perhaps by then President Izetbegovic had come to the same conclusion: under Holbrooke's leadership the US delegation was more inclined to see Milosevic as the one who had to be satisfied, even if at the expense of those positions where US and BiH interests were aligned. I had offered my resignation as Foreign Minister a week earlier, as a way to issue a protest as well as make myself free of any personal political intimidation. (President Tudjman had been seduced and the Croats were broken on any negotiating defense of the Posovina region, the area around Brcko along the Sava River. In fact it had been my negotiation and work with Wes Clark that had managed to secure a small enclave for the Federation in Posovina. Again, this was one more area to counter the scheme for "clean" boundaries and thus in the future encourage the reintegration of BiH).
  
As we walked, President Izetbegovic offered to me that he could not go back to BiH if he had given away Brcko. President Izetbegovic had already been refused on his offer that Brcko's fate be left to the future, perhaps by arbitration. As we walked and evaluated our options, President Izetbegovic offered that he would go to bad early that evening after telling Holbrooke and Bildt that he would not cede Brcko, even if it meant the breakdown of the talks. He instructed me to do whatever was possible during the night to salvage Brcko and peace.
  
I'm not certain that President Izetbegovic in the end would have left Dayton for Brcko. He was convinced that BiH needed peace even with the unfair concessions demanded of us. Holbrooke and company knew Izetbegovic's thinking. Worse, they had become accustomed to eventually wearing him down to his minimal position. President Izetbegovic was negotiating, bargaining, but they were engaged in a different back and forth, poker. He did not recognize their game, but it was their table. They employed, both bluff and the overwhelming weight of their favored position. And yes, they generally knew what his hand was, his bottom line. Even if America was and is BiH's best friend of means, it did not translate to the personal diplomacy of some US representatives. Regardless of who else won or lost, Holbrooke was not going to walk away from this table empty handed.
   
SETTING THE TABLE
  

Holbrooke's eagerness though could be used to our advantage. Up to that point, he had done all possible to control the environment and how each party to the talks would play its hand. He chose the Wright Air Force base for his ability to monitor discussions, manipulate the atmosphere and demanded a media embargo, which he regularly broke to selectively feed information. Thus, the BiH delegation was to be deprived of its moral platform.
  
When Holbrooke called Izetbegovic's room that night, the President told him to speak to me. I informed Holbrooke that as far as we were concerned, Brcko was non-negotiable. In my view Holbrooke had been once again outplayed by Milosevic and was now again going to try to reddem his lost chips at Izetbegovic's, BiH's expense. I also told him that President Izetbegovic was making arrangements to depart for Sarajevo the next day, with or without US assistance.  
  
Holbrooke wanted to send two of his senior deputies to see President Izetbegovic and me regarding a joint communique with respect to the breakdown of the talks. I smelled growing desperation and a bluff coming. I informed him that Izetbegovic had delegated all such further discussions to me.
  
The two Holbrooke representatives came to my room around midnight with a typed proposed communique. After reading it, I offered that we would issue our own media report as to the causes and consequences of the collapse of the Dayton talks. We were not obliged to follow the Holbrooke interpretation and spin. I asked that travel arrangements be made for President Izetbegovic and the rest of the BiH delegation. Otherwise, we would proceed on our own.
  
I began to reach out to my media contacts, and to inform them that the talks were to be declared at an impasse by Holbrooke and company. Of course, I also presented the Bosnian/Herzegovinian perspective on the causes. The reporters were hungry for new information, and would act upon it immediately. (I must be honest here. I was conflicted: doubt in Dayton's legitimacy but fear that the suffering and killing could continue. Nonetheless, I took satisfaction in pressing this hand here to what I believed was at least a marginally better result or a breakdown).
  
Reports were already starting to go out based upon my statements that the Dayton talks had collapsed. By 4:00 AM though, I received one then another call from my media contacts. They informed me that the US representatives were in fact now telling them that the talks had not collapsed and were going to continue.
  
CALLING THE BLUFF: IN END BiH & U.S. BOTH WINNERS
  

It would be too satisfying for me to claim now that I had bluffed Holbrooke. Perhaps I had called his bluff and turned it around. However, it is more accurate that we probably compelled Holbrooke to play another, better hand with Milosevic, and not just the most expedient hand at our expense. In the end, BiH and the US were both winners, at least on this one round.
  
I walked down to President Izetbegovic's room, around 5:00 AM, and whispered to him that I believed that Holbrooke had been bluffing regarding the "communique" regarding the collapse of the talks. The phone rang soon thereafter and the US representative indicated that they had a potential breakthrough. A meeting was scheduled for 7:00AM or so.
  
Milosevic had acceded to the arbitration option.
  
ARBITRATION THAT PROVIDED BiH WITH VISION FOR WHOLE COUNTRY
 

Roberts Owen turned out to be the appropriate arbitrator on Brcko, in demeanor, legal experience and understanding of the issues. In the end, our arbitration representatives then led by VP Dr. Ejub Ganic, understood the issues and consequences. Brcko was won for BiH even if a "special district" as long as it did not give RS control and provide for clean boundries.
  
Several generations of American officials overseeing "Brcko District" had helped deliver a relative success for the citizens of Brcko. The foundation of success was shared government among all, but also avoiding ethnic delineation. Brcko had succeeded as much because it had by arbitration and administration avoided the ethnic methodologies that have made the entities, particularly Republika Srpska, regressive.
   
BRCKO AGAIN AT STAKE ON THE TABLE
   

Roberts Owen and I had been colleagues, and Damir Arnaut asked me to aid him with an introduction. Ambassador Owen, as Brcko arbitrator, could provide his formal position or informed view in helping resolve consistent with the interests of the citizens of the district and also all of BiH. Damir had talked with Ambassador Owen on at least 2 occasions, and I once more since the introduction. Ambassador Owen was suffering an acute ailment, and I'm most appreciative that he committed his time to meet and reviews Damir's analysis.
  
Ambassador Owen has not provided a formal view, and I will not betray any confidence in terms of our private talks. The latest debate on Brcko resembles the bluff and bluster played out in Dayton over 13 years earlier. The result will be determined as much by the interaction between US officials and those representing the long term interests of BiH as by the substance and legitimacy of arguments. BiH is at a disadvantage, and I'm confident, witness that Damir Arnaut has spoken truthfully, and believe that BiH should not be bluffed or intimidated. To be a partner with the US, BiH representatives must command respect and not allow themselves to be intimidated by false accusations or bluster. 
  

Muhamed Sacirbey

--------------------

Author was a Signatory of the Dayton Accords and Foreign Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

--------------------