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A PACKAGE DEAL FOR THE MIDDLE EAST – February 10, 2007.
---- Note from the Editor ------------------
The Iraq Study Group Report released on December 6, 2006, intensified the worldwide debate about the future of Iraq and the Middle East. Although conclusions of the Report gained support of the Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and John Howard, they were rejected by the Bush Administration, which chose not to follow ISG’s proposals.
As the result the debate about Iraq still continues as there may be some other strategic options, previously not mentioned or explored, which would gain broader political agreement. The purpose of our Magazine is to provide a place for intellectual exchange of believes and opinions. Doing so, we present the following essay by Dr. Tadeusz A. Kisielewski, which is the outcome of his professional research and study conducted over several past years.
Dr. Kisielewski’s proposals differ from those of Iraq Study Group and the Bush Administration, therefore we find his article interesting and worth consideration by everyone who is interested in the future of the Middle East and the U.S. foreign policy.
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America’s immediate goal after removing Saddam Hussein and destroying Iraq’s capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, was to transform Iraq into a democratic federal state. America’s ultimate aim is to spread democracy across the Middle East, which is, with the exception of Lebanon and Jordan, ruled by authoritarian monarchs and dictators. Though realizing either of these aims now seems doubtful, they are still not impossible.
Americans believe that their federal constitutional model is the best in the world, and seek to promote it as a panacea for all socio-political problems. In fact American-style federalism arose from certain specific historical circumstances, and only really works best in America. In Africa and Latin America the same system has produced corrupt dictatorships. Trying to introduce Western democracy in toto in an Arab country at one stroke is to attempt a cultural revolution from the outside. Even the Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ in Iran in the 1970’s was a less courageous experiment, and it ended in an Islamic counter-revolution. Samuel P. Huntington correctly pointed out some years ago that one can not export civilization. The same conclusion has been reached by Benjamin R. Barber and other scholars and political leaders. Thomas Jefferson said that democracy begins with democratic, educated and self-conscious citizens. The only Muslim country which has partially shifted its cultural alignment is Turkey. Even there, foreign political, structural and moral patterns were imposed from the top down. Norman Mailer once said that true democracy arises from relations among people that have evolved over decades, or even centuries. The only protections a democracy has from chaos or tyranny are democratic traditions with their roots in a country’s history. Henry Kissinger reminds us that it took Western democracy centuries to develop. Democracy is new to the Muslim world. The positive side of this is that Muslims can learn from the experiences of others and adapt proven models to Muslim culture.
Iraq, with its current unnatural boundaries and volatile ethnic, religious and social structure, is the least appropriate place for Washington’s experiment. True, Iraqi society is the most secular and educated of all Arab countries. According to a poll conducted by American Enterprise Magazine in August, 2003, in several Iraqi cities 43% of the respondents never take part in Friday prayers at a mosque. Iraq has the highest percentage of participation of women in public life and the highest percentage of people in the services industry. It also has the lowest percentage of people employed in public administration (around 10%, while in other Arab countries it is over 30%). This makes for less corruption. But in the mid-1990’s Saddam Hussein ordered a return to religious and traditional roots. The consumption of alcohol was condemned, coeducation in schools was abolished, religious education was encouraged, and the Baath Party shifted its focus from Arab nationalism to Sunni Islam. The only way a society can have a workable federal state instead of a unitary government is with at least a minimum of democratic culture, along with tolerance toward ethnic and religious differences.
As a new Iraq slowly emerges it will have a more liberal society than under Saddam Hussein’s regime; but it will still be far from Western standards of freedom. This is regrettable, because from the 1920’s to the early 1990’s Iraq was the least restrictive of all the Arab countries, or even of all the Muslim countries, in the status of women, a factor John Stuart Mill saw as a good test for the advancement of democracy. The world will still benefit from the present situation, but only to the extent that the new ruler will not be able to rebuild Iraq’s weapons arsenal and will keep in mind Saddam Hussein’s fate. Edward N. Luttwak correctly points out that by the first three months of the U.S. occupation it was clear that none of the relevant Iraqi social groups were interested either in democracy or in creating a federal state. Given their interest in the status quo, each would lose something if democracy were implemented. As Joseph S. Nye notes, democracy is not the only instrument of transformation that can affect the roots of terrorism. Of equal importance are economic growth, the development of civil society, and openness to the world. Democracy will not persuade today’s jihadists to change their ways. On the contrary, imposing democracy too swiftly may only destabilize governments and increase chances for extremists to spread chaos.
Ken Jowitt said that Americans want to implement democracy because democracies do not fight with each other and do not protect terrorists. This is a worthy view, but the problem is putting it into practice. President Bush made a mistake in Iraq. He and his advisors – Condoleeza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz – believed that people worldwide are naturally pro-democracy. They also assumed that it is racist or paternalistic to say that not everyone is capable of democracy. Sadly, we need to tell the people of the Middle East plainly: forget democracy. If you want to kill one another, go ahead. But if a new ruler like Saddam arises, or if anyone manufactures weapons of mass destruction we will strike again, says Jowitt.
The United States did not pick Iraq as its first choice for an experiment in exporting Western civilization into an Islamic country. Rather, Iraq is the first Middle Eastern country since the independence of Qatar in 1971, where the West has had the opportunity to influence the shape of society by direct military intervention. Washington understands the risk it is taking, but paradoxically its strategy lacks audacity or a broader perspective. The U.S., and the West as a whole, assume that keeping Iraq together is vital for stabilizing the Middle East, especially given the ongoing threat from Iran and the growing crisis in Saudi Arabia. Even Henry Kissinger warned that by undertaking military intervention, the U.S. will have to maintain the unity and integrity of Iraq if it wants to preserve the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.
However, in the Middle East there is no underlying dynamic stability in a geopolitical sense. Since the 1920’s, Iraq has been in a kind of political refrigeration, comparable to the situation in Central and Eastern Europe in the period between the Yalta Conference and 1989. Here is the proof: for twelve years, from the spring of 1991 to autumn 2003, the integrity of Iraq was a fiction. Iraqi Kurdistan was under the protection of the UN Security Council, and Baghdad was not in complete control of the south. Despite this, neither Iran nor any other country in the region attacked its neighbors. This ‘stability’, or rather frozen stasis, was maintained by the U.S. and Great Britain. But the attempt to modernize – or help Arabs modernize – the Middle East has disrupted the balance of power in the region.
The biggest problem in the Middle East is not Iraq, but the Kurdish issue. The key to restoring stability to the region is Turkey. A solution needs to be found which will both strengthen Turkey and bring a just resolution of the Kurdish problem. The U.S. should work to strengthen democracy in Turkey, a nation rooted in Islam but approaching Western standards of development. More modest in scope than trying to export federalism and democracy to Iraq, bringing democracy to Turkey together with a solution to the Kurdish problem could pave the way for the democratization of the entire Middle East.
Former German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, is probably the only Western European politician thinking in long run, geopolitical terms. In an interview in the Berliner Zeitung (February 28, 2004), Fischer argues that for the true unification of Europe to succeed, along with reconciliation between nations and economic integration, Europe must take into consideration a strategic dimension. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989, or even up to September 11, 2001, strategically Europe was the province of the U.S. But in a global war with Islamic terrorism the American nuclear umbrella is useless. Europe needs to take care of its own security. This war requires close cooperation between the Western democracies. But Fischer believes that thus far Europe has shown a “lack of strategic consciousness” and a “lack of skill in developing a strategic dialogue with America.” For Fischer, Europe’s interests lie in rooting Turkey in Europe, encouraging democracy in Iran, and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Realizing these aims would mean “a strategic victory in the fight against the terrorist threat.”
Since 1994, Wolfgang Schauble and Karl Lamers have called for the full integration of Europe as a culture. But Europe cannot narrow its focus solely to internal integration and ignore external threats. Schauble and Lamers have developed an agenda for the European Union’s domestic policy, while Joschka Fisher proposes an agenda for a pan-European foreign policy. Fischer wants to eliminate external threats to the EU and either neutralize or win over at least some of her enemies.
For those who ask what the limits of the EU’s expansion should be, the answer is that the EU’s boundaries should not be construed in a strict territorial sense, but in a civilizational one. The EU should admit any country that shares the fundamental values of Western civilization. Turkey is approaching this point and should be helped rather than hindered. Opponents of Turkish membership point to the problem of Turkey’s rising population and backward agricultural system. Commissioner Franz Fischler was a proponent of a thorough reform of the EU’s absurd Common Agricultural Policy. But at the same time he was wary of the costs the EU would have to bear in subsidizing Turkish agriculture, as if he doubted the political feasibility of limiting massive agricultural subsidies.
Samuel P. Huntington believes that it would be wiser for Turkey to carve out a role as a leader among the Muslim countries, rather than be an outsider in the EU. He is wrong. The Arabs have never regarded the Turks to be entirely proper Muslims, therefore Turkey could never outbid Saudi Arabia for religious leadership of the Muslim world. But Turkey is a secular country, and has the potential to bring European ideas of separation of church and state into Muslim civilization.
THE KURDISH PROBLEM
Some political conflicts are considered unsolvable because of the sheer number of parties involved, or because one party’s interests are incompatible with those of others or seem to be so. Such struggles are often a combination of a number of zero sum conflicts. (A zero sum conflict is one where the winner takes everything and the loser gets nothing.) It is also a rule that a minority deprived of its rights will choose military confrontation in two situations: (1) to counter military assault or legal discrimination or (2) when influenced by extremist propaganda.
Both situations apply to the Kurdish issue.
There are a number of Kurdish parties and political groups, all struggling for autonomy, but differing greatly in their tactics and political agenda. They are also divided along tribal or clan lines and by which of the four countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria) the Kurds live in. All seek autonomy for the Kurdish territories. Their ultimate aim is independence, but this is seldom discussed publicly in the international community.
The Kurdish country consists of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, the northwest corner of Iran and the northeast part of Syria – altogether some 500 thousand square kilometers. ‘Great Kurdistan’ would be better placed to survive independently than many existing countries. It could generate significant income from oil exports. It possesses abundant water resources, an ample population of 20-28 million people, and a numerous and well educated intellectual elite. Its weaknesses would be its economic backwardness, tribal and clan divisions, and lack of access to the sea.
Great Kurdistan is impossible under present circumstances, because the Kurds do not have enough power and external support to achieve that aim. Nor could a Kurdish state be established solely on Turkish soil. Turkey is powerful enough to prevent this and could count on U.S. support.
A Kurdish state formed from Iraqi Kurdistan is also doubtful. Turkey would see such a country as a threat to her security. The creation of such a state would start a secessionist movement in Turkish Kurdistan. The federalization of Iraq would have the same effect. Consequently the Turks have insisted that the oil-rich Kirkuk region not be included in Kurdish territory in an Iraqi federation. Kirkuk and its oil would strengthen the Kurdish state and add to its attractiveness as a role model for Kurds beyond Iraq. Turkish Kurds would demand autonomy from Ankara, in fact federalizing Turkey. From there it would only be a step to uniting the Kurdistans of Iraq and Turkey into a single country.
Nor is there a chance of creating a Kurdish state inside Iran. Persians constitute around half of Iran’s inhabitants. If Tehran allowed the secession of Kurdistan, the six million Iranian Azeris might join their five million brethren in post-soviet Azerbaijan. Iran would lose its whole northwestern quarter. In such a situation the reaction of Pakistan, China and perhaps even India and Russia would have to be taken into account. The peace of the world would be jeopardized.
Thus establishing any independent Kurdish state is either impossible or would send dangerous shockwaves around the world. But Kurdish national aspirations can still be fulfilled, in a way that would bring the benefits of peace and security to the region.
The Kurds are people of unidentified origin, who have inhabited their mountainous land since at least the 5th century, and have long fought for independence. For centuries the whole of Kurdistan was controlled by Persia. From 1514 until the end of World War I, most of Kurdistan belonged to Ottoman Turkey.
During World War I, the Turkish leadership tried to preserve the integrity of Ottoman Empire by encouraging Turkish nationalism and making an alliance with the Central Powers. In 1915 and 1916 Great Britain suffered heavy losses in the Dardanelles, Gallipoli, and in Mesopotamia between Basra and Baghdad. The British therefore promised to create a Kurdish state after the war, in order to create a diversion in the Ottoman rear. When Turkey was defeated in 1918, it lay at the mercy of the Allied Powers, including the Greek military. In May of 1919 Greek troops landed in Smyrna (Izmir) and occupied East Thrace, while Istanbul and Southern Anatolia fell under a combined British-French-Italian occupation. At Sevres on August 10, 1920, the victorious powers presented a treaty that would abolish the Ottoman Empire – detaching its Arab provinces, creating a Great Armenia and Kurdistan, and handing over to Greece all the Aegean islands, Smyrna, and East Thrace together with Gallipoli and the European coast of the Dardanelles.
Although the last Turkish sultan, Mehmed VI Vahideddin, accepted the Sevres Treaty, the treaty never came into force. Instead, the demands made brought the rise of Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalist movement, and the Turkish War of Independence. Kemal fought not to sustain the Ottoman Empire, but to preserve the territorial integrity of the Turkish heartland. To strengthen its hand, the government of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) entered into a friendship agreement with Soviet Russia, defining their mutual border. Kemal’s army defeated the Greeks. The Allied Powers withdrew, and preliminary peace negotiations brought the truce of Mudanya on October 10, 1922. The truce guaranteed East Thrace and the administration of the Straits to the Turks. The Lausanne Conference (1922-1923) restored Turkey’s full sovereignty and defined its borders in Europe and Asia. The treaty resulted in an exchange of refugees of unprecedented proportions. By 1924 over a million Greeks from Anatolia and 380,000 Muslims living in Greece were forced to leave their homes.
It is hard to say whether the Treaty of Sevres was more the result of ignorance and miscalculations, or of political intrigues. Giving Greece East Thrace, with the Dardanelles, Imbros and Tenedos Island, and the Smyrna enclave, was wrong – strategically, geopolitically and in terms of ethnic realities. The long and bloody Greco-Turkish War that resulted revived lingering hatred and distrust between the two nations, going back to the centuries-long occupation of Greece by Turkey. Creating Great Armenia was also pointless given that the Armenian population was marginal in much of its territory. Only the decision depriving Turkey of her Arab provinces was unquestionable. But when the Western powers abandoned the Treaty of Sevres at Lausanne, they over-compensated by trying to accommodate Turkey’s wishes on the Kurdistan issue.
The Treaty of Sevres assumed that a Kurdish state would be created. But the conference in Lausanne, the League of Nations decisions made in 1924-1925, and the British-Iraqi-Turkish agreement of 1926, led to the three part division of Kurdistan. The main portion remained part of Turkey, the oil rich southeast part was given to Iraq, under British control as a League of Nations Mandate, and a small part of Kurdish territory was given to Syria.
As early as 1921, the Kurds felt betrayed when a portion of their territory was detached to become part of the newly formed state of Iraq, and they revolted. Today, the Kurds endure as a discriminated minority in four countries (including Iran), and armed rebellions against oppressive regimes have become an inseparable part of their modern history.
Why have the Albanians been given what amounts to a second homeland in Kosovo when they already have an independent state of their own in Albania, while the Kurds are denied their own state? The West has erred, not only in misunderstanding Iraq's regional role , but in passively accepting Turkey’s position on the Kurds; a position that is gradually becoming an anachronism in light of recent political changes in Turkey itself.
TURKEY
Kurdistan has become an open wound for Turkey. Originally the Western powers sought to nearly annihilate the Turkish state, but eventually they made Turkey too big to be a unified, homogeneous entity. Ethnic nationalism, with the dream of creating a homogeneous Turkish state, was one of six principles of domestic policy adopted by Turkish Parliament in 1937, and is one of the fundamental doctrines of the ideology of Turkism. According to the constitution, all citizens of Turkey are Turks. Kurds are called “Mountain Turks”. In 1992 then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, announced that the Kurds would not be granted autonomy because it would lead to divisions and conflicts within Turkish society.
Demirel’s statement has another purpose as well. In 1991, the Kurds, encouraged by Iraq’s defeat, declared that an independent state in Iraqi Kurdistan would be enough for them. In this they have been supported, to an extent, by Great Britain. Kurds living in Turkey and Iran would be allowed to settle in Iraq if they suffered discrimination in their countries. Euphoria led to unrealistic goals. Iraqi Kurdistan could not accommodate several million Kurds migrating from Turkey or Iran. But if given autonomy Turkish Kurdistan would be big enough for an influx of several million Kurds from Iraq and Iran. Such a massive influx was feared by Demirel, because it would change the ethnic structure of Turkey and strengthen the Turkish Kurds to the point where independence, or a long and bloody civil war, would be unavoidable.
If the Americans succeed in federalizing Iraq, many Kurds from Turkey and Iran will flee to Iraqi Kurdistan, especially if it includes the oil-rich Kirkuk region. But if not all of them can settle in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish Kurds will soon demand autonomy of their own. This would be unacceptable to Turkey, and would re-ignite the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Thus the American plan to federalize Iraq may unintentionally sabotage Turkey’s interests and create a potential threat to the future peace of the region.
In March 1993 the leader of the terrorist Marxist Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah
Öcalan, declared a cease-fire and accepted the principle of the integrity of Turkey. But after a few months the Turkish authorities rejected an offer of talks with the PKK, stating that “neither political party supports the federalization of Turkey.” As of 1996 Turkish Foreign Ministry was still interpreting
Öcalan’s statement as an intent by the PKK to “steal part of Turkey”. The PKK later became known as KADEK – the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, which in 2003 was renamed Kongra-Gel – the Kurdistan People’s Congress.
The idea of federalizing Turkey is not a new one. Several years ago the idea was brought up by Prof. Mikhail Lazarev, an expert on Kurdish issues. The problem with previous plans was that they were always confined to Turkish territory. But a basic principle of diplomacy is that if a problem cannot be solved individually, then a ‘package deal’ can be put together, resolving two separate issues at the same time.
Some Kurdish leaders still recognize Iraqi Kurdistan as a part of Iraq, simply because they don’t want to fall under the control of Ankara. The Turkish press and leadership claim northern Iraq as a “historic Turkish land” and want the Turkish-Iraqi border moved south to a line where the mountains in Iraq start, even if this would leave Kirkuk’s oil fields within Iraq. Gaining control of part of Iraqi Kurdistan would help the Turks crush the center of the lingering Kurdish insurgency in Turkey.
Turkish domestic policy, including its policy toward the Turkish Kurds, has changed recently, as the Turks endeavor to meet EU membership requirements. The power of the Turkish army has been officially limited, but its position has not changed; and the key to future progress still lies in the hands of the military. The army, which under Ataturk created modern Turkey, can still intervene in important matters. Worse, the army remains fixated on the policies of 60-70 years ago, regarding them as unchangeable dogma, beyond reinterpretation or revision. Two such petrified dogmas are nationalism and secularism.
Turkish nationalism is understood as national homogeneity. Secularism is not seen as state neutrality in religious matters, as in the Western democracies, but as a sort of warring atheism, as in the former Soviet bloc and other so-called socialist countries.
The Shah of Iran’s revolution turned into a counterrevolution because Reza Mohammad Pahlavi was regarded by his nation as an outsider. But Atatürk, the chief architect of the Turkish reforms, was a hero in Turkish war for national survival and independence. Atatürk was above suspicion of serving foreign interests, even if his reforms might be considered alien to domestic traditions and culture. Therefore he was successful in his wide ranging reform program. In Turkey today tradition and religion, far from being remembered as an armor which once was making it impossible to enter the path of modernization, have gained allure as forbidden fruit in the spiritual and ideological vacuum of Turkish society.
Today these traditional values are the province of Islamists. They appeal to the poorest economic classes, who see in a return to the past a hope for improvement in their lives. At the same time, Turkish intellectuals still reject Ottoman traditions and cultural heritage, including tolerance toward ethnic or religious minorities, and the role of religion in social life. Similar attitudes are seen in the army, which as the real power in Turkey makes this militant secular nationalism the reigning political philosophy.
One solution would be to abandon secularism and the rigid Kemalist nationalist ideal of a homogenous country. This should be replaced by a true democratic system with political pluralism. The democratic leadership arising from this would understand that trying to hold together a multinational country by force is impossible. The Turkish leadership should also take a second look at some of the best traditions of the Ottoman Empire, from the days of its greatness as a multinational society, namely flexible tolerance and a healthy connection with religious values. This would strengthen modern Turkish society. The end of the Ottoman Empire was marred by an increase in intolerance and internal violence – this should be a warning for the Turkish authorities.
Despite recent changes in legislation the Turkish army is still the final arbiter in Turkish politics. But the army would be the most prone to firm, but well measured pressure by NATO, the European Union, and especially the United States. It was the Turkish parliament, rather than the government and the army, which opposed joining the military intervention in Iraq and blocked the transit of American troops through Turkey. Therefore there is some hope of constructive change from above. But too often the West merely reacts to developments on the international scene rather than is shaping them.
PACKAGE DEAL: TURKEY – KURDS - IRAQ
What measures can the West propose to strengthen Turkey and at the same time resolve the Kurdish problem?
First, the members of NATO and the EU need to abandon the outdated assumption that the key to stabilizing the Middle East is Iraq, although Iraq can still be a source of democracy in the region. Secondly, resolving the Kurdish issue so that the rightful aspirations of the Kurds are satisfied, and Turkey is strengthened, is essential to a lasting peace in the Middle East. Thirdly, we should ignore the official statements by Turkey, Iran and Syria that they are against the partition of Iraq. They are only against the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. All of them – especially Turkey, which has territorial claims to Northern Iraq – would welcome the partition of Iraq if they stood to benefit by it.
A federal state should be created, consisting of two parts: ethnic Turkey, and Kurdistan, including the southeast portion of present Turkey and northeastern Iraq, with the Kirkuk oil fields. This would not be a partition of Turkey, but rather her expansion in accordance with rational geopolitical and strategic needs. This would be the only way to resolve the Kurdish problem by transforming it into a non-zero sum deal.
The benefits to Turkey would include:
- enlargement of its territory and population.
- elimination of the external source of the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq.
- domestic peace.
- ending the expense on years of merciless domestic conflict, though this may not be in the interest
of the Turkish generals.
- gaining access to the rich oil fields of Kirkuk, though some formula must be worked out for sharing
the profits between the two parts of the Turkish federation.
- gaining the unconditional support of the West, undoubtedly increasing Turkish chances for EU
membership
- promotion to the status of unquestioned regional superpower, a status which would be enhanced
by democracy and economic development; with influence reaching Egypt and China.
At the same time, the Kurds would gain:
- equal status within the federation, beyond mere provincial autonomy.
- Kurdistan would be a part of a regional superpower.
- Kurdistan would gain access, through Turkey, to the sea.
- the profits from the oil fields of former Iraqi Kurdistan would allow accelerated economic
development by the whole country. The Kurdish standard of living would rise, allowing the
modernization of Kurdistan’s archaic social structure.
The benefit to the West would be a revitalized, modernized and stabilized Turkey. Turkey would be a powerful NATO member, situated on NATO’s most sensitive flank, and would extend NATO’s influence beyond its southeastern borders. Turkey would be a sort of transition zone between Western and Islamic civilizations, decreasing the chance of a clash between the two. Finally, resolving the Kurdish issue would be an effective response to those who justly accuse the West of double standards in supporting human rights.
The easiest part would be to persuade the Kurds to agree to such a project. A bigger problem would be convincing the West that the project is in its interests, and in Turkey’s interests (not to mention the aspect of human rights), and then getting the West to push Turkey to accept it. The hardest task will be convincing the Turkish leadership to take advantage of a historical new opportunity for their country.
Turkey would have to redefine the basic rules on which the modern Turkish state was founded. It would be in fact a new Turkish revolution. The Turks would have to abandon the un-achievable dream of a country with one uniform nation, and embrace a return to some traditional cultural and religious values, while preserving the secular character of its institutions.
Such a revolution would be impossible without the cooperation of the Turkish army. Therefore the West must persuade the Turkish generals to follow the plan for a federation. If the Western states act in accord, they can persuade the generals to revise petrified Kemalism. More and more domestic political events in Turkey suggest that the military understands the new challenges their country faces.
We can assume that such a plan will at first be rejected by all parties, and opposed by Russia. The Kurds and the Turks will be wary of any collaboration out of deeply rooted mutual fear and distrust. John Grey reminds us that democracy, especially in a federal system, requires trust, something hard to find in societies divided by a history of brutal conflict. But the rise of the European Union proves that distrust, fear, and even hatred do not determine relations between countries forever, and that these fears can be overcome by addressing rational interests. The on-going rapprochement between Turkey and Greece argues against fatalism. There is no reason to believe that Turkish-Kurdish relations cannot be normalized.
If the West, Turkey and the Kurds could reach an agreement, only the formal procedure for creating the federation would remain to be settled. The most appropriate method would be to conduct a referendum in Turkey. The votes should be counted separately for the territories dominated by Turks, and in Turkish Kurdistan, while a UN plebiscite could be held in Iraqi Kurdistan. The referendum and plebiscite would be held in conjunction with elections to local parliaments in both Kurdistans. If the referendum and plebiscite pass, the Turkish government and two Kurdish governments would establish a new, federal state, while the government of Iraqi Kurdistan would secede from Iraq.
Such a plan would be legitimate based on the principle of self-determination of peoples (Chapter I, Art. 1, Paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations). Self-determination does not mean that every territory, in every situation, can secede and create its own state. But the Kurdish nation is populous enough. It is the most populous nation in the world without a state. The Kurds inhabit territory extensive enough to exercise the right to self-determination as long as the peace and security of the region are maintained.
The plebiscite in Iraqi Kurdistan should not only be conducted in territories currently inhabited by a Kurdish majority, but also in territories from which the Kurds were relocated by Saddam Hussein, especially in the Kirkuk region. The alternative would mean accepting the results of Saddam’s ethnic cleansing. Turkey should not artificially limit the territory of Turkish Kurdistan, but should establish borders in accordance with the range of the Kurdish ethnic homeland, and include corrections for geographical and economic factors. For Ankara to do otherwise would be a bad omen for the future of a federal state. Turkish Kurdistan should extend west at least to the Euphrates, while its northern border should be on the Peri Suyu or Kara Rivers, and should reach the Aras Nehri River toward the Armenian border on the east.
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Iraq would lose a part of its territory, population, and oil revenues. But it would still be able to build its economy, and its position as a regional power among the Arab nations would remain. The loss of some of its oil revenues would be roughly proportional to the decrease in Iraq’s population. Therefore Iraqi living standards would not fall. Iraq would keep the Mosul oil fields on the right bank of the Tigris, the Khanaqin – Naft Chana region, and the Ar-Rumayla – Az-Zubyar oil fields between Basra and Kuwait. The loss of Kurdistan would eliminate a major source of the ethnic hatreds that plague Iraq. Iraq would be stronger because it would no longer have a large portion of its military tied down in suppressing the Kurds, and would be able to focus on national defense. NATO can further bolster Iraq by guaranteeing support for Iraq if attacked by a third party.
Iraq would remain a large, populous and potentially rich country. If Iraq becomes a viable democratic state and maintains friendly relations with the West, it will be an important role-model for other Muslim countries.
A satisfactory resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and Iraq would revive the Kurdish question in Iran. Some Iranian Kurds would relocate to free Kurdistan, but the majority would stay in Iran and become a strong force for democracy in there.
The West and Turkey may simply continue avoiding the issue. But if the Kurdish problem is not solved soon in a way that reflects the just aspirations and rights of the Kurds, conditions will worsen. A wounded, bleeding Turkey will remain at the periphery of Europe. NATO’s southeastern flank will be weakened, while Germany and other European countries such as Sweden will face growing riots and terrorist attacks by Kurdish immigrants.
Resolving the Kurdish issue could become the basis for a common European Union foreign policy. If the United States insists that the EU admit Turkey as soon as possible, the EU should respond that we must first resolve the Kurdish problem.
IRAQ: THE FINAL BATTLE?
Iraq is not the key country in the Persian Gulf, but whether Iraq maintains its territorial and political integrity or collapses, will do much to determine the future of Kurds, and indirectly, Turkey. Therefore developments in Iraq need to be considered here.
The Iraq Study Group, in its 2006 report for President Bush, stated that the strategic aim of American operations in Iraq should be to avoid a final catastrophe, and stabilize the country, while cutting the number of American troops in Iraq by half. Such an approach is contradictory and politically wrong. It is contradictory because the decrease of troops recommended by the Iraq Study Group will never bring stability to Iraq. It is politically wrong because the aim of the coalition military intervention should be victory, whereby Iraq is made stable enough to establish a strong government and maintain the country’s integrity, unless all options are exhausted. But because we still have options, we should utilize them, including measures that until now have been kept in reserve. Such an approach is outlined by senators John McCain (R) and Joe Lieberman (D), and supported by experts such as Fred Kagan and Gen. Jack Keane.
President Bush eventually rejected the suggestions of the Iraq Study Group and vowed to utilize all options possible to improve the situation in Iraq. But because of opposition in Congress he limited the number of additional American troops to be sent to Iraq. Doing so may hamper the success of what may be a last-chance effort. The American contingent is to be increased by a mere 21,500 troops, less than half the numbers called for by Kagan and Keane. Some military experts believe that an increase of 300,000 or even 500,000 American troops would be needed to have a real chance of success in Iraq. The present proposal, however, does give hope that Iraq can be stabilized, even with such a small increase in troops, assuming that some conditions are met by the Iraqi government. These conditions may be part of this strategy, but if so they have not been announced to the public.
General David H. Petraeus, an expert in urban warfare, proposed a change in strategy and tactics, which has been needed for the last two years: abandoning the “firefighter’s method”, running from one fire to another but focusing on systematically clearing the most dangerous territories. Gen. Petraeus is a soldier, but the action he is calling for will combine policing with strictly military tasks. The largest action of this type was carried out by the Soviet NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs), under Gen. Ivan Sierov in Poland in 1939-1941 and in 1945, when the Soviets rounded up hundreds of thousands of Poles, and deported them to the USSR, where thousands later died or were murdered. The NKVD’s troops utilized “cordon tactics”, meaning sealing off towns or urban districts or villages and thoroughly searching every house and apartment. It is the single most successful anti-insurgency tactic. Utilizing these tactics in Iraq would require bringing women soldiers in every American search team, because strange men entering the women’s portion of Arab homes would cause mass riots by the Iraqis. But limiting searches to the men’s part of Arab homes would be senseless. Bringing search dogs into Iraqi houses has to be excluded as well.
Another element of the new strategy should be restricting the possession of arms (especially automatics), and explosives by the Iraqis, and requiring them to hand them over to the American troops, perhaps with some monetary compensation. Of course not all these weapons would be handed over, but the flow of arms to the insurgency and militia groups would be diminished, while local violence would be reduced. Perhaps there should be an exception for the Kurdish provinces, especially for local Peshmerga units. The rest of the Iraqis could keep their hunting weapons.
Thirdly, the American plan calls for deploying troops in districts of Baghdad where the insurgency has been put down. These troops will help in restoring order and rebuilding those districts. But successful cordon tactics require the isolation of the secured territories as long as there is a chance that unwanted elements can slip back in. The question arises whether there will be enough American troops to carry out this task. There is also a possibility that before the American offensive, insurgent groups will try to slip out of Baghdad until the operation is over. This has to be provided for or the success of the operation will be in doubt. It would actually be better if as many insurgents as possible came into Baghdad before the start of the operation. While it would make pacifying the city more difficult, it would probably mean less trouble in the countryside, and some American troops stationed there would be able to join other troops in temporarily isolating Baghdad from the rest of the country.
Fourthly, it is vital to secure the borders with Iran and Syria and to the greatest extent possible limit the influx of foreign terrorists into Iraq, especially at this crucial point in the overall Iraq operation. Unfortunately the small number of American troops deployed may make securing the borders the weakest part of the planned effort. It may be better to conduct limited counter-strikes into the border regions of Syria and Iran if they do not refrain from aiding and abetting the export of chaos into Iraq. The proposal by Iraq Study Group, supported by prime ministers Tony Blair and John Howard, to ask these two countries for help in stabilizing the situation in Iraq was absolutely pointless. It is in Tehran and Damascus’ best interests just to maintain the level of chaos in Iraq. (Although recently the Syrian government has expressed some worries about the growing numbers of refugees and the position adopted by the Syrian Kurds.) Asking these two regimes for support would suggest that America is helpless. Even if the request was granted, the political price for such assistance would be high, while there would be no guarantee of it working. Iran and Syria might agree to limited cooperation in stabilizing Iraq, but only if they saw that doing the opposite would badly hurt them.
The announced plan of pacifying the insurgency consists of operations in Baghdad and then Anbar Province. These are the two most turbulent regions of the country. Assuming that these operations will work, one must ask how the Americans and the British plan to ease the situation in the Shiite south, especially in the city of Basra? Perhaps it is too early to discuss this problem before the still uncertain success of operations in Baghdad and Anbar, and perhaps the allies do not want to prematurely antagonize orthodox Shiites, but if the Baghdad-Anbar operation succeeds, then the next step must be the pacification of the Shiite militias in southern Iraq. This will be far more difficult than the clearing of Baghdad and Anbar Province.
Dr. Tadeusz A. Kisielewski
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Dr. Kisielewski is a writer, independent researcher and analyst of international relations. He holds a Ph.D. in political science and is the author of several books, including "The New Global Conflict" (1993), "Russia – China – NATO" (2002) and "Imperium Americanum?" (2004).
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