[PREVIEW] Exclusively for the European Courier:

INTERVIEW WITH MR. MUHAMED SACIRBEY – July 30, 2007

– former Bosnia's Minister of Foreign Affairs (1995-96) and Ambassador

to the United Nations (1992-2000).

---From the Editor----------------

The full transcript of the interview and a video are coming shortly.

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[…]

Muhamed Sacirbey: The war in the former Yugoslavia came at a decisive time in the global political transformation. Of course, the conflict and the genocide directed at Bosnia and Herzegovina had more locally immediate causes and implications. Nonetheless, events in Bosnia and Herzegovina almost from the outset began to be framed in the context of this global transformation and what was then optimistically referred to as the “new world order.”

The United States, the newly defined Russian Federation and France were the three major protagonists. The United States needed to answer the challenge of its own and NATO’s relevance in the new Europe apparently without the Soviet threat and communist divide through the continent. Russia, at first sought to soothe its second tier status particularly within its own ample ultranationalist community by asserting the new role as defender of Orthodoxy and rival to the U.S. France, more accurately, Mitterrand was eager to define out NATO and the U.S. from the new Europe. Bosnia & Herzegovina unwittingly became the battleground for these imperial ambitions, and by extension, the United Nations was their diplomatic testing ground and ring.

You will recall, Francois Mitterrand flew directly to Sarajevo in late June of 1992, from Portugal from an EU Summit. Mitterrand was attempting to convince that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was an exclusively European issue, to be managed exclusively by Europe and France would act on behalf of Europe. Mitterrand would be its new face.

On several occasions, Mitterrand put forth several initiatives, which were supposed to be an alternative to the old European and global divide. And theses initiatives were in a form of something, what he defined as European Defense Organization. At various times, as Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations and foreign minister, I was representing Bosnia at some of those initiatives, which of course is a bit of irony because my dominant cultural identity is American. And I recall one of these meetings in the spring of 1994 in Paris. Of course, the United States was not at all present at any Ministerial level. Russia, under foreign minister Kozyrev, who has become since a good friend, was also invited. But as one understands everything is about sitting arrangements. And in the first seats were countries like Germany, France, but the Russian foreign minister was delegated to the second row and actually Bosnia and Herzegovina was sitting in the second row next to him. So it tells you kind how Mitterrand was trying to rearrange the power structure of Europe. The “new” European countries like Poland, Hungary were represented sitting somewhere in the second and third row. But the European lead was sitting in the front, of course with the French foreign minister Allain Juppe, but most notably Mitterrand himself was sitting at the front.

He was sitting behind the desk, a very big teacher’s desk that was elevated on a platform and the platform itself was like two feet above the ground. When the meeting started we were all in a small reception with cocktails and Mitterrand of course was there in the beginning. Then he disappeared. We were asked to sit down, and maybe fifteen minutes later he would appear on this platform. His speech, his presentations, did not seem to be written beforehand. It seemed to be rather a kind of monologue or a discourse about how he saw a new Europe. Within all this language the new Europe effectively was free of NATO and the Soviet Union but, in fact, of course it was being led by the old Europe, which of course was France ahead of the list.

Sebastian Aulich: Let me interrupt you for a second. So you basically say that the reluctance by NATO to intervene was due to French opposition and Mitterrand’s endeavors to create a different kind of Europe, a Europe, which would be free from NATO?

MS: Of course the politics are never a clear as the trench lines of World War I. Rather it is kind of charge and withdrawals of various initiatives. When in fact there was inclination of the first Bush administration to act it was always discouraged by France. In fact Mitterrand took upon himself to appear always to deflect an inclination to intervene on behalf of NATO. Sometimes it was as in Sarajevo in late June 1992, when he flew into Sarajevo and any NATO air strikes would be seen as direct offense to Mitterrand, and he knew that.

But there were also other moments, for example in August of 1992, when now we have direct evidence of the concentration camps, which were created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and mass killings. My friend, Milan Panic, who was at the time Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, told me as he found himself with Mitterrand in Paris at that time.  Mitterrand said to him “you Serbs are starting to get a very bad reputation, you are looking very bad, there could be very much an initiative or a desire to act by the United States and NATO, we need to call another conference”. Mitterrand said “I wasted, spend all of my bullets already, let’s call Prime Minister Major and ask him to organize a conference in London”.

So according to the story, Francois Mitterrand called up Major and he found him on vacation in Scotland fishing in some river. At that time was born the idea of what was to become known as the London conference of 1992.

SA: Let me ask you a question about the involvement of the United States. Do you think that the part the U.S. played; the policy of Clinton administration in respect to Bosnia was successful or was it a failure?

MS: During three and a half year of the conflict the role of the United States changed from day to day, from time to time and of course depended on the individuals involved. When we speak about Madeline Albright, remember that she is as one would say, “also one of us:” that is in very much reflecting my identity and I would guess in part also yours. She was born in a former communist world of Eastern Europe, but had in fact become American and that was now her primary identity. So when people would speak about the “new Europe”, the former communist countries, and they would speak of them in a context of ethnic or religious prejudices, I think that was something she, we all understood as being misguided, but also something that we understood being frankly not an adequate or proper response to the problem.

So people like Madeline Albright, I think drew what I would call inclusionist policy. That is countries from Poland to Bosnia and Herzegovina would be eventually absorbed into NATO and into the European Union. In this context she also ended up playing very complementary role with people like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was very supportive of Bosnia’s case and who also had an inclusionist perspective and people like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, who came from neo-cons. So you had a very wide specter of people who understood that it was a test for Europe and NATO. Some of them were Jewish, some of them were Christians, others Muslim, but all shared this notion that the religious identity of Bosnians, that is Muslims, was maybe just a coincidence or something that was being abused by identities rather than that which would define the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What would define the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the inclusion into a bigger European family and as we know it was a process that encompassed not only Bosnia and Herzegovina but also countries from Poland, to Hungary, Czech Republic, to the Baltic states.

On the other hand you had a group of people, who were probably disinterested because they little identified with this “new Europe” and I think there were people like that around Bush, the first. They probably knew the importance of establishing a new kind of vision of the American and NATO role in Europe. However, in their electoral analysis, I think, it was always about taxes and sex, in the sense that they always assumed that the thing the American public cares and would vote upon was about what taxes they are paying or how do they feel about the issue of abortion or promiscuity on TV or whatever.

The general view has always been that Americans don’t care about foreign policy when voting. It is however not that much they don’t care about foreign policy but not understanding all the details, they don’t want to talk about the Berlin congress, they don’t want to talk about what happened in 1972, they want to talk about what is happening now. Foreign policy does actually effect American politics significantly because at the perception of leadership is very much framed how an American President acts in foreign policy environment. In many ways President George Bush lost much of his prestige, in terms of leadership role that he played in Kuwait, by the lack of a similar presentation of his leadership in the combustion of former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

People somehow understood that the so called “new world order” wasn’t evolving in the real new world order with America on top of it; it was evolving very quickly into a “new world chaos”, with America being forced to become not the leader but the policeman.

We also have to speak about some American leaders who created views about former Yugoslavia on the basis of other prejudices or other direct interests. Of course it’s not much of a secret that people like Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Eagleburger, who was the head of the Department of State, had different set of interests and experiences in respect to former Yugoslavia, which I believe affected their proposals regarding the solution.

When Clinton came in there was anticipation that there would be much more active involvement on part of the U.S., in terms of help from NATO, but also in terms of help in setting a new kind of agenda based more upon democracy and justice rather than on antagonisms between the Soviet Bloc and the U.S., or France. Unfortunately, this failed in part because Clinton was told very early on that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a losing cause: Bosnia and Herzegovina was not going to survive much longer. Of course and fortunately, this proved to be untrue and in fact Bosnia and Herzegovina did not go to the grave and eventually the policy makers came to see Bosnia as a problem because it persevered and survived. Some reformulated history and even the diagnosis of the causes in order to fit their previously and continuing inept response and proposed remedies.

SA: You say that President Bush lost his leadership, his prestige because of inaction toward the crisis in Bosnia, however the conflict in Bosnia erupted in 1992, a presidential elections year, when a fierce political campaign was already underway. Do you really think that he could have done more? If he had sent the troops to Bosnia wouldn’t he be accused of doing it only to reassure his re-election for the next term? The American voters usually are unwilling to replace their president during a war time.

MS: That’s very accurate but that’s a dilemma that every president faces. He, though, appeared disinterested. He thought “I won my next election in Kuwait, then why lose it in Yugoslavia?”.  He tried to play it not only too safe but he in fact did not define the issue in anyway that would promote what I would say a more progressive American involvement. Recall, that the conflict in Slovenia and Croatia had already started in 1991, but this U.S. Administration was absent. And, when some of it’s members did interact, it was through Milosevic’s office in Belgrade. Ultimately, former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade Warren Zimmerman subsequently actually resigned to protest U.S. inaction or passivity in the face of this aggression and horror.

So ultimately whatever President Bush did gain in Kuwait in terms of leadership was perceived as coincidental rather than due to his specific leadership role. How do you explain American president losing second term election after what he achieved in Kuwait? Certainly the United States was economically doing very well; there was no other challenge to American wealth or social standing, and there was just defeated Soviet Union, the competitor America had for the most of the century, and the president who was supposedly part of all of this, loses the election. Simply, America did not see him as a leader in the new age, in the new world order. Clinton appeared much like that kind of a leader. Clinton made the point very frequently speaking on the issue of former Yugoslavia. In fact before Clinton was even nominated, I met or spoke with various high officials of his campaign, like former vice-president Fritz Mondale, who played very important role in Clinton’s rise to office.

SA: So you say that Clinton was viewed by the voters as a better leader, more suitable to lead in the new world order, but once he assumed his office, he actually didn’t do much for Bosnia and Herzegovina only until the fall of the UN safe area of Srebrenica. 

MS: That’s unfortunately in large part correct, but I would have to say that the failure of the Clinton administration was not so much to Clinton himself as it was to some of the people that eventually came in. Certainly people like Warren Christopher, tended to perpetuate the old view.

Of course, people like Madeleine Albright tended to formulate much more progressive view of Bosnia and even before the old Bush was out, that is in late 1992, there were changes in policy toward Bosnia, which I believe were constructive and these were influenced by the elections. (There was a rather interesting event at the UN in December of 1992 that was already tinged by the influence of Clinton’s coming inauguration as well as the neo-cons, but that is a story for next time). But certainly I agree that there was not decisive move until the fall of Srebrenica. However I still think that Clinton’s was a very different approach.

SA: Let’s talk for a while about the Dayton Peace Accords. You took part in those peace negotiations. Do you think it was a good solution for the crisis? Serbs were granted almost half of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina although they constituted only 35% of the population, they were a minority in Bosnia.

MS: Of course like everything else it’s a mixed message. When you end the war it is something positive in and of itself. I certainly don’t think that Dayton had to be so flawed. It’s flawed in at least two major ways. One of them is the point you addressed, which is the sense of injustice, the sense that in fact the aggressor is rewarded. The other problem is that it creates a very poor foundation not only for the integration of the region, and specifically for Bosnia and Herzegovina into the EU, but the region as a whole. It creates this notion that somehow nationalism is the defining element of the future issues that are going to be affecting European extension. So right now you have the Russian nationalists who have very much entrenched themselves as defenders of Serbian nationalism. And what I think the problem with Dayton is, is that it is legitimized, this extreme nationalism. By legitimizing it, it has been prevented from being cured. So now in fact the whole Europe is affected by Dayton, not only Bosnia. Once you have it legitimized, then it’s very hard to come back to say there is something wrong with it or that we have to get rid of it. What we hear now in respect to Dayton is that everyone is at fault, but who really was at fault are the United States and the European powers. They gave Milosevic the seat in the negotiations in Dayton, who in fact dictated the solution and how it all would look. It now affects the future of the EU, the European-US relations and Euro-Atlantic family.

From the Bosnian perspective, there is another thing, which I was not aware at the time, and that is you mentioned Srebrenica, but there was also Zepa, another town called Gorazde; these were three of the so-called “safe areas” defended by the United Nations and NATO. In order to give Milosevic what he wanted to get a deal in Dayton, a few months before general Janvier, who was French general representing the UN, Carl Bildt, then effectively acting on behalf of the UK and France even though theoretically representing the EU, and U.S. representative on behalf of Holbrooke, made the deal with Milosevic, that they would allow his forces under Mladic, to take over, in fact attack these enclaves in order to create new geographic fact on the ground. This game was played not only in Bosnia but also within Croatia.

It’s ironic that those who perpetrated these mass killings are now being sought for those acts, but those who allowed them to do it, allowed them to do it in contradiction to UN Security Council resolution and also a NATO resolution, have never been held accountable. There was very clear UN Security Council resolution and NATO commitment from the highest level to defend these civilians, to defend these people. On the other hand there was betrayal of this commitment, what is not only betrayal of those people but also of those institutions, the United Nations and NATO. I think that is a betrayal that will come back to haunt us. For example most of the countries of the European family and of the United Nations were not aware of this deal, including the Dutch, who were in Srebrenica and who in effect were left with small arms incapable of defending Srebrenica. They were the ones who were supposed to call NATO’s airplanes to come in and defend and they did call NATO to come but those planes were stopped from coming.

SA: Let’s come back for a second to the issue of involvement of Milosevic in Dayton peace process. In November 1995, when the negotiations were being conducted it was already known that Milosevic was responsible and that he should be brought to justice for the war crimes he committed. Nevertheless the United States involved him in the peace process. Presently America declares that it doesn’t negotiate with the terrorists, but in 1995 the U.S.  negotiated with war criminals. Was the U.S. applying double moral standards to this case or was Milosevic simply indispensable at that time and there were no prospects of achieving peace without his involvement?

MS: All of us knew that Milosevic was ultimately responsible for this. It was also very clear that he was legally; this is criminally, responsible, because even though he might not have ordered any specific killings, he was in fact orchestrating campaign of ethnical cleansing, genocide, and acts that constitute grave violations of international humanitarian law. He was eventually indicted. But in 1995 at Dayton he was not indicted yet and that was a strategy that was being promoted by Holbrooke, in contrast to Madeleine Albright.

As you see, I am clearly defining a distinction between one segment of Clinton administration and another. At that time the segment that said that we have to work with Milosevic was the one which prevailed. Of course Milosevic himself was a master of manipulating this view. In his private discussions with people like Holbrooke he would speak in a way that was very degrading of Serbian nationalism, but in fact when he was doing it he was trying to play a game, as the facilitator of peace rather than orchestrator of nationalism,

He was able to legitimize himself as someone better than Karadzic or Mladic. In fact he was not. He might not be the true believer but he was not only the one who manipulated nationalism but most importantly perpetuated it. Through him nationalism gained legitimacy, which to this day exists. Before Dayton I was asked during the “Today Show” program at NBC whether I thought Milosevic should be indicted, and I said “yes, of course, he should be indicted; the evidence is pretty clear he is responsible for this”. Holbrooke response was to attack me that I was acting irresponsibly before the peace negotiations. However clearly the history has shown that my view was the appropriate one, but then, Holbrooke’s view was being perceived as the pragmatic one. But pragmatism in this case has not proven to be so pragmatic. I think that we, this is the Euro-Atlantic family, face the probability of losing Serbia for a very, very long time, not only to new Russian empire, but more importantly to a more normal Europe.

SA: Milosevic was eventually indicted in May of 1999. He died of natural causes in 2006, while his criminal case wasn’t yet decided. You supported his indictment and the creation of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia…

MS: Yes, I did support it. I think in 1992 there were talks about this Tribunal, but the “big powers” really did not want it. Then, it was held out as an excuse for inaction. The idea was, if we say that we will bring bad guys to justice at some time in the future then we don’t have to stop them today.

In 1993 and I have to give credit here to several people, one of them is Madeleine Albright, the other one is Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, a professor of international law at DePaul University, who was a member of the UN Commission of Experts to evaluate the situation, the third one is Mr. Diego Aria, Ambassador of Venezuela at that time, and myself. We pushed through a year later in 1993, to make sure that the Tribunal was in fact becoming reality rather than something that was held out as an empty promise.

SA: You were pushing this Tribunal. However the United States, when intervening in Kosovo, was against indicting Milosevic because they thought it would make him cling to power. Although he was eventually indicted do you still believe in international criminal justice?

MS: Yes, I certainly still believe in international criminal justice system. I was actually the one who signed Rome Convention on behalf of Bosnia on International Criminal Court in 1998. I am a little less enthusiastic about those special Tribunals, which American administration has promoted as an alternative to International Criminal Court. And the reason I am a little bit less enthusiastic about them is because, as you can see in the case of the Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, the only people that are held accountable, are as call them “the animals in the zoo”, and there are no zoo-keepers being held accountable and there are no questions about their role. In other words, the Special Tribunals can perpetuate stereotypes and complexes as well as self serving conclusions about the causes and solutions.

Nonetheless, there is now only the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and I support its sincere efforts as the only available alternative. I can tell you that people who were involved in prosecuting Milosevic had no doubt that the accountability for what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa went beyond Milosevic. That in fact there were people who had abused and betrayed their responsibility in respect to UN resolution, NATO resolution and of course international law. 

[…]

SA: What was the role of the Muslim world in the Bosnian crisis and the impact of this crisis upon them?

MS: If you look at some of the terrorists, who were involved in London attacks, you will always see them as speaking of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of their rationale for acting out against the very Europe that many of them belong to and were born into. And it’s not that we Bosnians encouraged them. To the contrary: it’s because they thought that what happened in Bosnia was being directly aimed at something that is identified as European Muslims. Therefore they saw this attack as a direct attack upon their European identity. If the blonde-haired and blue-eyed Slavic Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina didn’t have a chance to be accepted as Europeans then how could they be as the sons of immigrants, Pakistani or other, living in London? […]

To be continued...