SECURITY COUNCIL IN REHAB - November 1, 2007

WILL THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM?
 
You know that Amy Winehouse melody: “They wanna make me go to rehab, but I say, No, No, No!!!” Well, that obstinacy fits the UN Security Council, for the last 15 years or more. Everyone knows that the UN Security Council is in need of reform, but only the UN Security Council is in a position to ultimately act upon it.
 
The “P5,” the five permanent members of the Security Council, have so far had a painless time avoiding reform. The lack of consensus within the general membership of the United Nations has allowed the P5 to avoid any substantive reform, or even a serious discussion. While a few non Security Council permanent states, such as India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, Nigeria, have been jockeying with each other, the P5 have avoided a serious effort at reform by simply keeping a low profile.
  
However, whenever there has been challenge at their vested position within the Council, the P5 have shown a vigorous inclination to fend off incursion. Undoubtedly, if the remainder of the UN membership comes up with a broadly unifying plan, the real resistance will come. By allowing, for now, the “wanabe” Council members and challengers to knock each other around and off stride, the P5 are comfortably clinging to the status quo. Pakistan is not enthused about having its nuclear rival India as a permanent member while it is left off. Brazil reaps only limited support as permanent member among some Latin American states. There is a consensus that Africa deserves greater representation, but no single candidate from the diverse continent with clear advantage to gain such a permanent seat. If Japan, why not Indonesia, another large and certainly more diverse island state, as well as largest Muslim majority country? Even within the European Union, Germany’s aspirations certainly do not garner unanimous support from within the community, including an Italy which is G8 but left out of the “P” UN Security Council club.
  
SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM vs. VESTED INTERESTS
 
For many UN member states, and some of the most influential and active, the prospect that transformation would affect them negatively versus rivals is enough to impede most reform. Some prefer to continue as belonging to a vague second tier of influential states, right after the P5. The prospect of creation of another permanent class of UN Security Council members, even those without a veto, would drop them another tier in standing within the UN club.
  
So why not leave it alone? The status quo is not ideal, but it has been shown as functional. Change could even potentially ignite new confrontations among the aspirants.
  
IS REFORM REALLY NEEDED?

UN reform, though, is not only about adding permanent members. The Security Council has risked being out of touch with the general membership. The prospect for most states to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council is also an opportunity to be part of the processes, dialogue and debates that are recurrently the most urgent and contentious within the entire body, but are also frequently shrouded behind closed doors. While decisions are delivered in the Security Council Chamber, with its distinctive horseshoe table, the outcome is decided in otherwise restricted forums. The P5, P4, (the P5 less China), and P3, (P5 less Russia and China), have established their own improvised methodology for secretive discussions.
  
The P5, (as well as P4 and P3), meet on a regular basis on issues already before the Council or that may be encroaching upon its Chamber. It is not realistically possible that any resolution can pass without the support of most or all Permanent Members. P5 members have been reluctant to cast a formal veto within the Council. The threat of a veto is at times enough. More frequently though, the P5 as a group have been very effective at denying access to many issues by foreclosing the opportunity for an open debate at the horseshoe table. They can exercise this de-facto veto without ever being exposed. On more than one occasion in the discussions on Bosnia & Herzegovina in the early 1990’s, the P5, (or at times the P4), tried to obscure impotence or a lack of will on their part to address “threats to international peace and security,” or grave violations of international humanitarian law. The failure of the P5, (or at least P4), to gain consensus was in effect a bar to a discussion among the broader Security Council members, permanent and nonpermanent. In order not to be revealed, the P5 frequently combined to effectively block all debate.
   
The informal debates held by Security Council members in the small “consultation” room, next to the formal Security Council Chamber, are the main opportunity for the whole membership as a body to ever breach issues that may otherwise be blocked or overlooked. The consultation room is only a couple of feet from the Security Council Chamber, but it is completely walled off, without any windows except a couple directly facing the East River. The doors are closed during all discussions and non-Security Council members are prohibited from even setting foot into this room, (a rule that I managed to contravene a couple of times as notice of remonstration that the fate of the citizens and country which I represented was being decided without my ability to participate or even listen to the dialogue).
  
A CONSULTATION ROOM WITH A VIEW OUT
   
Nonetheless, the “informal consultations” of the Security Council offer an alternative not available within the P5, P4, or P3 configuration. Lower ranking diplomats as well as ambassadors may provide informal briefings to the representatives of the non-Security Council member states following the topic(s) of the day. These briefings have become more formalized as demand for information has verged on protest in some previous consultations. However, because there are 15 states present in the informal consultation room, the opportunity to gain uncensored and nuanced views of the discussion within is enhanced.
  
It is the non-permanent member states that feel most obliged to report the debate within. It is a form of democratic reflex toward the other member states that elect these non-permanent members to two year terms. During the election process, the potential candidates, especially in the more contentious races promise greater transparency, exchange of information and interaction with the general membership while they serve their two year term. Providing informal and timely reports to the general membership is a prime means of fulfilling a “campaign” obligation. It is also an opportunity for more genuine exchanges that are critical to the an effective diplomatic process and that go beyond the protocol.
  
On more than a couple of occasions, the informal consultations have provided for greater opportunity for the Council members to receive more accurate or unfiltered information. During one urgent discussion on Bosnia & Herzegovina, a representative of the Secretary General was providing a briefing.
  
Under normal circumstances, an interested party can formally submit its own information or arguments, and have them distributed to all members. However, there normally is no real opportunity for an exchange of information or discussion of the facts. The Secretary General’s reports reach the Council without much or any opportunity for review by relevant member states, and an official reply could take a day or more to be distributed formally.
  
However, in this instance in the spring of 1994, it was possible to interject regarding the briefing only due to the coincidence of events and the information being divulged from the Security Council consultation room and the opportunity to input facts into the discussion. While the Secretary General’s representative quoted the UN military commander on the ground, that same officer had been filmed speaking directly in a CNN interview that was being broadcast into the adjoining “lounge” where we were gathered, urgently, awaiting the Security Council action. The clear contradiction between the officer’s statement in the interview versus those cited to him by the Secretary General’s representative, were brought by me to the attention of one of the Security Council states within the consultation room. Shortly, the door to the consultation room opened, and the Council members spilled out toward the television in the lounge waiting for the CNN interview to be repeated.
   
It should not be concluded that the Secretary General himself was deliberately misleading. Information is frequently filtered by many objective and interested parties. UN officials, civilian and military, all have a nationality beyond their allegiance as professionals to the United Nations. Others may be subject to slight or unwarranted influence especially with the stakes involved. The United Nations and its officials deserve our respect, but not for any of us to close our eyes to potential abuse, innocent oversight or outright subversion.

The United Nations Security Council is bound to request and rely upon the Secretary General’s report upon issues that are placed on the agenda. This is a way of not only gathering more facts, but also avoiding chaos. Nonetheless, a more open Security Council discussing relevant issues should lead to all Council members being better and more accurately informed and with all due urgency.
     
CONTROLLED INFORMATION FLOW CONTRIBUTES TO GENOCIDE
       
In the debate regarding the genocide of Rwanda, the Security Council as a whole was poorly informed although some permanent members had much more timely indications of the crime unfolding. Unfortunately, the Secretariat was also acquiescent in the control or lack of adequate information flow. It is impossible to know all the potential consequences, but both the United Nations and some member states were obliged to admit mistakes, and not just oversight.
        
A reformed United Nations Security Council should reflect the past mistakes and lessons learned. Generally put though, it is possible to advance transparency, a more representative and a more responsive Security Council by enlargement and methodology.
      
TRANSPARENCY, NUMBERS AND METHODOLOGY
  
More seats in the Security Council consultations should reflect with more information flowing out of the “informals” and accurate and more details going into the discussion. It is simple mathematics, adding up ears and eyes as well as lips.
       
Further, after the membership of the United Nations has more than tripled since the Charter was adopted, it is also about numbers. Many of the member states have not had the frequent enough opportunity to participate as members of the Security Council. The Council starts to appear to some as a totally different institution from the rest of the United Nations. During several on going discussions, the consensus within the General Assembly differs substantively from the Resolutions, “Presidential Statements” or just no action coming out of the Security Council.
          
States such as Germany and Japan are recognized, but what about The Netherlands, Canada, Korea, Norway or Turkey, nations asked to pay an increasing portion of the bill but not necessarily frequent on the Council. Can some rapidly expanding economies, from the Arab Gulf to Korea to South Africa to Latin America be asked to pay more only to in reality expect even less tenure in the Council under the current system. Some regions as a whole have been dramatically transformed but continue to be underrepresented, including the so-called “Eastern European Group,” (which can offer only a single non-permanent seat every 2 years from well over 20 member states). Of course, by existing mathematics, some member states, maybe as many as half of the general membership cannot realistically expect to gain a UN Security Council seat in this century.
         
As important as is expanding the number of seats and opportunity for election to the Council, so is the methodology in the work of the Security Council. Access to the Security Council, or more accurately access by the Council to accurate and timely information is critical as well as imperative in developing a more responsive and transparent institution.
          
The “Arria formula” came out as a coincidence or more accurately refusal of the Security Council powers to hear a Bosnian/Herzegovinian priest in the summer of 1992 deliver evidence of the events unfolding in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Ambassador Diego Arria, the then Permanent Representative of Venezuela, a Security Council member at the time, opted to call for an informal meeting of “non-aligned” Security Council members to hear the priest in a separate meeting. Ambassador Arria then formally relayed the summary of the interview to the Security Council as a whole.
         
This evolution to the Security Council’s methodology came as a necessary response to doors, or more accurately, ears being closed through established channels. Since 1992, this innovation, the Arria formula, has served to keep the Council more timely and better informed. Similarly, it has placed a burden upon individual member states of the Council to weigh the relevance and veracity.
         
Security Council reform is an issue for the entire United Nations community. Unfortunately, though, it will not come just because the overwhelming majority of the globe’s states or citizens call for it. Simply stated, the United Nations is not a democratic institution, but rather one where vested interests have been promoted, achieved and protected over the 60 years of the organizations existence, and the world alignment coming out of World War II.
       
This may not be an entirely unfair or even unwelcome outcome. After all, the United Nations may be at one level, a club of equals, of sovereign states, but would it be fair or durable that Micronesia carries the same authority within all UN institutions as the United States? The more economically, militarily and politically capable states are called upon to shoulder a greater responsibility. Would these states give adequate credence to an institution that did not provide some deference to them?
     
OPTIONS AND CATALYST FOR REFORM
       
However, this is exactly one of the reasons for reform. Since World War II, some states have economically, politically and even militarily enhanced their capacity. Some of the most powerful states today were colonies when the United Nations was established. Japan and Germany have regained international standing, going from vanquished to the most dynamic economies and largest contributors to the United Nations system.

There are many other objective reasons driving reform of the Security Council. And, by no means should all or even most of the responsibility for lack of reform fall upon the P5. The real question is what will be the catalyst that will actually deliver the reform. Reform will most certainly necessitate the wanabe Security Council members to complement their disparate demands. On the other hand, the P5 cannot expect that they will insulate their current status from change. Interestingly, it could be something that the P5 does not have that will prompt it to consider all options. The International Criminal Court and the Rome Conference did not grow out of the Security Council, like the “Ex-Yugoslav” and Rwanda Tribunals, but is most reflective of the United Nations general membership.

Muhamed Sacirbey

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Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey holds B.A. degree in history and J. D. degree from Tulane University in New Orleans. He also holds M.B.A. degree from Columbia University. Prior to becoming Bosnia’s Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations, he practiced as an attorney in New York City and worked for several years as an investment banker. He presently writes his book “A Convenient Genocide, in a fishbowl ” and is a commentator on human rights and political issues.

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