POLISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS - January 12, 2008
     

The victory of Donald Tusk and his Civic Platform Party (PO) in Poland’s recent Parliamentary election signalled the departure of Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his 'Law and Justice party' (PiS). However, whilst one twin has departed, Lech will remain President until 2010 and since Presidential power in foreign policy is considerable, Tusk's own policy agenda will be subject to the constraints of cohabitation.

The election of October garnered high international interest. Poland’s partners in Europe hope for something a little less confrontational and abrasive. Across the Atlantic, there is also reason for the US to expect change since it is far from certain that Poland’s Atlanticism and strong support for US policy will continue to hold in quite the same way.

FOREIGN POLICY KACZYNSKI - STYLE
          
In 2005 ‘moral renewal’ and the restoration of national pride became political buzzwords. What might have appeared as a positive drive - corruption was indeed viewed as a serious problem in Poland at the time, quickly went into melt-down as the twins sought to get rid of their opponents, by increasingly controversial means, notably the extension of the lustration law. (K.L.: Under the Kaczynski's in March 2007 the remit of the law was extended to include academics, journalists, managers of state-owned firms, school principals, diplomats and lawyers). Just as the Prime Minister and President beat the nationalist drum domestically, they promoted the idea of a strong, nationally focused Poland externally and strived to be best friends with the US. Over time, however, as is well documented, Polish foreign and security policy became ever more introverted, unsophisticated and paranoid.

POLAND - RUSSIA - GERMANY: EXISTING TENSIONS WITH A NEW FEROCITY

In the 1990’s Polish-German relations hit a high point, when traditional enmity was seemingly overcome as Germany emerged as Poland’s advocate for NATO and EU membership. However, much of this goodwill evaporated after 2005. The German-Russian pipeline plan to go under the Baltic Sea bypassing Poland fuelled the twins’ Germanophobia, which became laced with xenophobic overtones. This was exacerbated by heightened calls from some quarters in Germany to create a ‘visible sign’ to mark the suffering of Germans during and after the close of the Second World War. Polish-Russia bilateral relations also hit a post-Cold War low under the Kaczynskis when the Poles vetoed discussions on a new Russia-EU agreement, in response Russia’s ban on Polish food imports.

AN AWKWARD NEW EU MEMBER

In Europe the Kaczynski’s presented an image of Poland that was out of kilt with European values and a state unable to accept compromise. To be fair, when it came to the question of voting rights in the Council, the twin's opposition to changing the ‘Nice’ formula was inherited from the previous administration, which was responsible for the slogan 'Nice or Death', but the gusto with which the Kaczynski brothers took up this motto was so profound that it almost derailed the revised 'Reform' treaty in mid 2007. Awkwardness in Europe contrasted with a slave-like attitude towards the United States.

MISMANAGED DIPLOMACY

After 2005 Poland’s diplomatic service suffered as a result of the twin’s program to root-out ex-communists. From the outset, they got rid of large numbers of career diplomats, but failed to replace them. So, for extensive periods key Ambassadorial posts, including in France and the EU lay vacant. The result was a managerial catastrophe – foreign policy became amateurish and prone to knee-jerk reactions.

CAN TUSK MAKE A CLEAN BREAK?

Many assume that Tusk will reject the Kaczynski's foreign policies wholesale and that everything will 'change for the better'. But, the Kaczynski's did not necessarily create all foreign policy problems, indeed many difficulties were long-standing and were inherited from previous governments. Second, there were a number of accomplishments made by the Kaczynski's in foreign policy, so there is also positive legacy that will be taken up by the new government. Note that whilst the Kaczynski’s assertiveness may have annoyed European partners, it did put Poland head and shoulders above other East Central European states. Finally, remember that when in opposition it was often the case that when Tusk’s party criticised the Kaczynski’s foreign policies it was not over ‘substance’, but rather ‘style’. [1]

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT TUSK AND HIS PRIORITIES?

Tusk is a Europhile. He hopes to see Poland’s economic fortunes grow in the EU and sees Ireland as a model of success that Poland should emulate. His aim is to exchange the Zloty for the Euro as soon as possible. He is set on boosting Foreign Direct Investment into Poland by cutting red-tape and economic protectionism. Tusk is keen to improve relations with Germany, and is likely to be less stubborn and emotional, though no less resolute, when it comes to Russia. His government will also appear less conservative vis a vis other European states. When it comes to Transatlantic Relations, whilst Tusk’s Poland will remain Atlanticist there will be a strong drive to be less subservient towards Washington.

Tusk’s foreign policy team has international experience and shares his pro-European, liberal outlook. Defence Minister Bogdan Klich was a former Member of the European Parliament and so will not be instinctively anti-European. Tusk's choice of Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski was controversial, not least because he was PiS Defence Minister. Sikorski has strong links to the US and the UK, and although he is an Atlanticist, he was bruised by his dealings with the US administration over Iraq and thus will be less yielding towards Washington and more open towards the EU. The third leg of Tusk’s foreign policy team is Wladislaw Bartoszewski who has a place in the Cabinet on 'extraordinary affairs'.

SOME EARLY INDICATORS

How much change and how continuity can we really expect from the new government? What are the constraints and opportunities? Will there be a change in substance or just in style?

There has already been a shift in Poland’s Atlanticism. Tusk wants his troops out of Iraq. Polish dissatisfaction over Iraq is still fuelled by Washington's refusal to do away with visas for Poles as well as the strong sense of disappointment felt when Polish firms failed to get contracts for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

Meanwhile, Tusk has declared that Poland’s 1200 troops will stay in Afghanistan. However, domestic criticism is on the rise after Polish soldiers were accused of killing six Afghan civilians, an incident which has questioned the public’s 'stomach for sending soldiers into faraway battle in support of allies’.

Warsaw’s participation in the US Missile Defence Shield and on what terms, will be a litmus test for Poland’s new take on Transatlantic Relations. Sikorski and Tusk want a better balance between Poland’s obligations and the US’s commitments. The Prime Minister has pledged that he will not be hurried into making a decision and that he will discuss the issue with NATO and with Poland’s neighbours.

European diplomacy has already been marked by a willingness to mend bridges. At the same time, expect Tusk to be a tough negotiator. Tusk has stated that there would be a change of ‘form’ and style rather than of substance in Poland’s EU policies. He cautions ‘I don’t want to inflate anyone’s expectations that Poland will suddenly become a problem-free member’, but he also insists that Poland will not be 'L'enfant terrible de L'UE'. Tusks’s EU priorities will be to pursue a liberal economic agenda, deepen relations with Ukraine, develop EU policy towards Russia and energy policy.

Tusk declared that the betterment of relations with Russia will be a foreign policy priority. Soon after coming to power Tusk set up a bilateral ‘Commission for Difficult Issues’ (Komisja Spraw Trudnych). This Commission may help unblock Russia’s relations with the EU, which were halted by Poland’s veto. But a number of ‘historical’ roadblocks remain in the way of the normalisation of Polish-Russian relations. There is also a clash of agendas when it comes to the futures of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

There have been positive overtures and gestures in German-Polish relations too. Bilateral relations will profit from having Bartoszewski at the helm and since Radek Sikorski and his German counterpart Franck Steinmeier apparently get on, notions of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘partnership’ have reappeared into the vocabulary of Polish-German relations. Problems will, of course, continue. Poles remain sceptical of the German-Russian pipeline, but at the same time there is now a willingness to talk with the Germans (and Russians) about this – as is also the case with the question of the ‘memorial’ to mark German suffering.
           
THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

Constitutionally, the President is Commander in Chief and is Poland’s highest representative in external relations. Tusk interprets this as meaning that it is his government who should run foreign and defence policies, whilst the President's role is to travel and represent Poland overseas. But Lech Kaczynski holds the view that he must be consulted on all major decisions. The conflict between these interpretations was apparent when Tusk assembled his government. The President’s office claimed that Foreign Affairs and defence nominations had to be consulted with the President. However, against Kaczynski’s opposition, Tusk chose Radek Sikorski as Foreign Minister. Soon after, Lech Kaczynski hired former PiS Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga as his Chief of Staff and spokesperson on foreign affairs, a sign that the President is prepared to do further battle with Tusk.

CHANGES IN STYLE, RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE

Since coming to power Tusk and his team have been on a charm offensive. The general tenor seems to be that a 'new start' can be had even in the most difficult of Poland's bilateral relations. Poland's European diplomacy will become more predictable and consensual, than was the case over the past two years. This will, of course, be aided by the fact that there are no major battles to be fought within the EU in the near future and second, that Poland's European partners are very positively disposed towards Tusk. This outwardly more open approach to the EU will contrast with a harder, tougher attitude to the United States, which will show itself in the Missile Defence Shield negotiations.

Notwithstanding these points, changes in Polish foreign and security policy after the October parliamentary elections will be more in the form of style as opposed to substance. Poland's post-1989 diplomacy was feisty and often awkward well before the Kaczynski's came to power. The crucial thing about the Kaczynski government was the style and manner in which foreign relations were pursued that gave Poland such a bad name. It was the PiS government's ‘way’ and not so much the content of its policies, that got Polish obstructionism noticed.

Tusk and his foreign policy team know that style matters. If Polish interests are going to be met then a new style has to be had. Tusk is manifestly aware that the manner in which diplomacy is carried out is crucial for the way in which Poland is viewed from the outside. Thus the new Government's initiatives have attempted to prise-off the 'anti-German', 'anti-Russian' and 'anti-European' labels, that adorned the Kaczynski's policies.

Tusk's policy agenda will be demanding, but it will be accompanied by a radically different style. Overtime, however, this new style may affect a change in substance.

Kerry Longhurst

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Kerry Longhurst holds a Ph.D. degree from the University of Birmingham, UK, and Msc (Econ) in strategic studies from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK. She is presently a fellow at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris. Dr. Longhurst is the author of a book “Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1989-2003" (2004) and the co-author of “A New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign Policy and Security Priorities” (2007).

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