HOW FAR THE RUMBLE BEHIND THE MORTGAGE DEBT CRUMBLE?

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF "SUB-PRIME CRUMBLE" - January 27, 2008

Well before my coincidental engagement in diplomacy, I had a lucrative career in finance and investment banking. It started as legal counsel to Standard & Poor’s in the early 1980’s, while still completing my MBA at Columbia University. Soon I was Senior VP responsible for New Product Development. It was a key time for the rating agencies’ commitment to evaluating and rating structured and asset backed financings. Residential mortgage backed securities were the first, and the securitization transformation soon moved to automobile and credit card receivables. Then, commercial mortgages would be poured into conduits. The stage was set for the liquidity explosion of the last decade or more, and the accompanying wealth and breadth. The methodology would soon be applied to ratings of non-US asset securitizations. US economic and political leaders were confident in the global triumph of the US economic model through this capital markets innovation. They were right then, but now there is a rather uncertain judgment pending.

"AAA" THEN AND NOW

Then, when reviewing and applying “AAA” ratings to mortgage and asset backed securities in general, the relevant criteria was internally perceived as or more demanding than on most ongoing industrial/commercial enterprises similarly rated. Public ratings address timely payment of debt service and principle over the life of the debt instrument, (from long maturity bonds to commercial paper). The rating is indefinite for the stated term to maturity. The rating though did not and could not anticipate and address market liquidity for such rated instruments. The rating only addressed credit considerations even as rated instruments have become pervasive in many capital market innovations. More recently forged instruments, particularly derivatives were accorded ratings. What are the consequences of this evolution, is the current problem what it appears to be, and, most critically now, what are the global strategic implications? Be assured the problem nor the consequences are limited to the US.

CREDIT OR PERCEPTION?

The popular theory: US real estate imploded due to a bubble as mortgages had been handed out with the carelessness of credit cards. This would conveniently lay off the fault on the multitude of presumably unqualified and undeserving creditors/mortgagors, (who would now be obliged to lose homes), as well as on the “greedy” investment bankers/underwriters who might lose jobs, (but probably not the big profits and bonuses).

To be certain, many more qualified, as George Soros, and I agree that the problem is worse than perceived even now by the general public or projected by regulators and the Wall Street titans. The current tumultuous moves in the equity markets are reverberating the deep uncertainty, but probably do not yet reflect the potential, even probable drop in valuations.

Diagnosing the problem properly is appropriate to provide the optimum remedy. Regardless of cause, we should seek remedy that in treatment is not worse than or exacerbates the ravages of the ailment. Beware of simplistic home remedies or those that amputate the leg to save the big toe. As for blaming it all on greed: Well, greed always plays a role on Wall Street, and it is only identified as the problem when it blows up in everyone’s face. Otherwise, it is touted as a necessity of capitalism, if not a virtue. Greed is the fever only observed when someone detects an infection and starts checking temperatures. However, the fever of greed is always present and probably natural to the Wall Street physiology. The diagnosis is in understanding how the greed has been gratified in this time.

Blaming unsuitable mortgage underwriting standards is appropriate, but to degree. This, though, also conveniently places the responsibility and burden upon those who are designated to lose the most. We are talking about millions of people, many who had never experienced a problem of this magnitude. They will lose their home, their credit standing, their buying power, access to better jobs and be rejected for health insurance. They will be more likely to become permanent members of a rapidly growing underclass cashing meager wage checks at the local pawn shop, at a fee of 5% of the top. (Pawn and check cashing stores are one of the most rapidly growing “industries” and favored business models in the United States).

However, there are further fundamental flaws in this above, rather simplistic allocation of blame:

1. Price drops of complex capital markets’ instruments not understood and consequently avoided in a panicky marketplace bleeding liquidity. The problem is also perception as credit. While defaults may be high, even unprecedented in modern times, the highly rated classes, or “tranches” of such securitized pools are not experiencing losses at presumed levels solely due to credit losses. (Lower rated or, more likely, unrated, subordinated classes are absorbing the losses, mostly and for now). The bigger problem may be that most investors are now discovering that they really do not understand the multiple derivatives and the complex relationships underlying the many classes secured by any pool of mortgages. Simply, the rating no longer provides comfort to potential investors searching in the dark and anecdotal rumors for insight about further credit erosion and defaults in the underlying mortgage pools. Drops in value may be as much due to marketability impaired by a lack of investor information/understanding, (even if credit losses may also be affecting some higher rated classes and probably most pools). Ratings addressed credit risk with respect to a particular class, but not the market perception and liquidity for such instruments.

2. Rapid housing price rise followed appreciation of all real asset classes as well as US Dollar depreciation. Housing prices did rapidly rise in the US, and generally globally. However, during the same period US $ also rapidly declined and all real asset classes, from gold and copper to lumber and oil, experienced rapid appreciation. In this context, there was not so much a bubble in real value terms. Even now, Euro and other foreign currency based purchasers are still buying up residential properties in key international access markets, such as Manhattan, perceiving such as bargains even if there has been no appreciable decline in US $ prices. Perhaps, it was not as much a valuation bubble bursting as US wages not rising and keeping pace to reflect US $ declines. Relaxed underwriting was ahead of the mortgagor’s earning capacity.

3. “Creative” mortgage products recently introduced did certainly contribute to the current problem, but most US homeowners have for some time been accessing “non-conforming” mortgages, without noticeable added default risk. Credit underwriting standards may have been relaxed overall, but the criteria applied by the rating agencies for the highest “investment grades” were several factors of “worst case scenarios” experienced during the Depression. Of course, I have not been intimately familiar with all the standards for a couple of decades. “Creative” mortgage instruments may not have extended historical data upon which to model “worst case scenarios.” Is it possible that the rating analysis may have not been adequately sourced with historical data as to new, “creative” mortgages? Non-conforming mortgages is a much broader term encompassing well established, as well as more recent “creative” innovations. Default risk is more likely associated with more recent “creative” mortgages, (not all or most “non-conforming mortgages). Some “creative” mortgages may have inadequately reflected the mortgagor’s capacity to meet dynamic, more demanding conditions as well as inbuilt escalating payments.

The typical US home owner saw the investment in housing in the context of the traditional American dream, egalitarian promise. With the US $ erosion, increasingly though, it also became the only realistic alternative to protect wealth against pending inflation and to reflect in the typical owner’s meager portfolio, the rapid appreciation of all real asset classes. However, if we conclude that US housing prices escalated into a bubble, then what about other housing markets in developed/developing countries where the domestic currency actually appreciated.

TIGHTENING MORTGAGOR CRITERIA THROUGH REGULATION WILL ONLY EXASPERATE THE PROBLEM AND PROLONG THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

Tightening credit standards now will not ease the current problems. To the extent that criteria were too relaxed, it is too late for current mortgages in countless portfolios. The financial institutions still underwriting had already more than clamped down, especially as it relates to new clients. One might conclude from empirical observation that the pendulum has already swung well toward too restrictive. This may be worse than too relaxed, in the current environment where unwinding will take time and patience.

“Tighter” regulations on lenders and mortgage lending probably and ultimately will be an essential element of regaining stability. However, the current rush to new regulation is being pursued without the benefit of enough distance and time from this wreck. It reminds of driving down the road with anxious eyes fixed to the rear view mirror. Slowing down will not necessarily insure a safer ride if you do not focus your attention on the future, and it does little for the pedestrian that just got run over.
           
Mortgagors keeping up with their payments nonetheless may not be eligible under the more restrictive criteria to obtain new mortgages as part of changing homes for jobs or other economic purposes. They may not be able to take advantage of the aggressive Fed interest reductions to refinance into more manageable and steady rates because as “non-conforming,” the options may be few or none. They will not be eligible to reduce their living expense costs at a time when the US is flirting with recession or worse.

This reduced flexibility could nullify attempts at enhancing liquidity with Fed rate cuts or other efforts at infusion. At least through the medium term, a board depreciation of residential values in non-inflation terms will continue. As Americans relied upon home values as the primary source of net worth, spending and retirement security, the consequences are seismic.

This immediate decline in home values will be paradoxical. While home prices along with new construction will dramatically decrease, longer term housing costs will increase for the average American following the current appreciation of other real asset classes. Now, Americans will lose homes that will be even more out of reach for them to acquire in the future.

THE SCARLET "D": DEFAULTING INTO THE PERMANENT UNDERCLASS AND "SERVING FAST FOOD TO TOURISTS IN T-SHIRTS"

America’s political stability is based upon the truth and myth of the American dream. A crucial element has always been home ownership. Home ownership is credit dependent. America has evolved into unprecedented and pervasive credit reporting hounds.

Many consumer loans, credit cards and even home equity loans are cross defaulted. (Default on one triggers a default on all). Even if not cross defaulted, declining credit scores/ratings will trigger interest hikes on much or all of the consumer’s debt, as high as state usury laws allow, (29.9% in many US states). At a time when many homeowners may need to reduce their debt service payments, they will actually be charged with higher payments. With declining incomes and job options, many consumers will bleed red until default and stigmatization with the Scarlet D.

Greater economic opportunities will become even more remote, as the borrower is credit limited in developing small business, (the American ideal), or securing better jobs. Today, many potential employers also screen applicants by credit score and a poor score can be as detrimental as a criminal record to upward job mobility: an unprecedented vicious cycle with the pummeled consumer facing few options and more hard sells.

(Rather than be cautious with its unprecedented power over job, reputation as well as credit, one credit agency has launched a new wave of commercials prompting consumers to purchase regular updates of their credit report or face the job prospect of “serving fast food to tourists in T-shirts.”)

Never will so many Americans be scarred by the Scarlet D, not qualifying for credit, insurance or many job options. Never will America deliver so many of its citizens to a permanent underclass.

THE PROBLEM IS LIKELY TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN SOME OTHER CREDIT RECEIVABLES, INCLUDING CREDIT CARD AND AUTO, BUT NOT ALL

- Credit card and auto loan receivables are also likely to suffer deterioration, at least in part exacerbated by drops in home values. These receivables have also historically been securitized in substantial quantities. However, the rating agency criteria are much more conservative reflecting the historical data and collateral, or lack thereof. Further, the duration of such receivables, therefore securities, is of relatively limited duration. The deterioration probably is not yet fully come across, but the capital markets will not be as deeply affected as in the case of mortgage backed securities.

- “Fannie Maes” (FNMA) and “Freddie Macs” (FHLMC) are effectively US Government backed securities collateralized by mortgages. They will trade in line with their perceived US Government standing, although they could suffer marginally from the uncertainty and market conditions currently associated with most mortgage backed securities. For a long time, they were the only game in town, the two agencies purchasing “conforming” mortgages from a variety of relatively small residential investors in particular S&Ls, (Savings & Loans institutions), that once dominated the local US banking market. These two big dinosaurs are likely to regain significant market share. However, they continue to suffer from the limitations that initially gave rise to private issuer mortgage backed securities: they are restricted from purchasing into their pools “non-conforming” mortgages, (as defined by size as well as underwriting criteria), and are bound by bureaucratic/regulatory methodologies.

- Commercial Mortgage and Conduit Backed Securities have become dominant factors in the commercial real estate lending field over the last decade or so. (Conduits are special purpose corporations/enterprises specifically created to provide capital markets access and liquidity to commercial real estate lending much in same fashion as earlier generation facilitated for residential mortgages).While businesses and commercial real estate have not experienced the declines and depreciations associated with consumer mortgages and credit, the repercussions are undoubtedly reverberating. New lending is either highly restricted or unavailable. Regardless of the initial talk and supporting empirical data that business has been largely disjoined from the US consumer in this “crisis,” the capital markets are responding very cautiously. Many commercial mortgages made during the last part of this summer, presumably under normal conditions, still cannot be sold into conduits and “securitized,” signaling a chill, if not an outright freeze. It is noteworthy though that most commercial mortgages, especially industrial, warehouse, distribution are effectively secured with long term leases from premier business credits and highly predictable cash-flow streams. However, for now, anything real-estate as well as innovative capital markets instruments/derivatives are suffering from fear, at least the fear of the unfamiliar.

- Business, medical and many other type of commercial receivables were swept into the securitization/derivative trend. Such instruments are relatively minimal in capital markets implications, but it is still difficult to identify the long term consequences. Some are subject to their own dynamics and particular history, (as medical receivables had their own blow up a decade or so ago).
      
BOND INSURERS, THE CANARY IN THE CPITAL MARKETS' DARK

Bond insurers, such as MBIA and AMBAC, are specialized guarantors wrapping around or “lending” their AAA rating to a variety of municipal, corporate and, now ever more, securitized financings. They do not necessarily have deep capital and reserves, such as more full service insurers. Most are relatively recent creations, last quarter century or more, a by-product of the rating agencies decisive role. They maintain their rating by the traditional application of diversification and by insuring what are already assumed to be rather conservative risks on their own, “BBB” or marginal investment grade. They’re generally not efficient insuring non-investment grade risks: too much of their capital/reserves would be allocated to any one such risk. These bond insurers were most efficient, at least traditionally, when in effect wrapping their AAA rating around BBB underlying risk.

The publicly traded, specialized bond insurers have been dropping in value ever since the initial rumble of crumble this summer. AMBAC, this last week, had lost 90% of its summer of 2007 highs. (End of week trading saw recovery in equity prices as there was a surging tide for buyout/bailout).

Because BBB rating criteria are significantly more relaxed as compared to the highest investment grade, AA to AAA, the underlying mortgages and other receivables collateralizing the insured securities have been prone to and exhibited initially greater losses or vulnerability. In effect, the premium paid to bond insurers under more normal conditions has gone from being a modest return on low risk to now no return or losses on much higher than anticipated risk. Because timeliness of payment is part of the bond insurers’ guarantee, they may be already anticipating paying out on policies while it may take much longer to realize recovery on the underlying collateral. The current market may trigger an avalanche of policy payments, regardless of the longer term ability to recover on the collateral. The bond insurers may be facing a liquidity crisis themselves, and have not exhibited great success in raising new capital/liquidity. The perceived risk surrounding their name and industry has also impeded new business income. They’re reputed to be paying for new lines of credit at much higher levels than then a AAA company should. Obviously, the business model and the specific companies are facing doubt, at least regarding their AAA standing.

Because the bond insurers do guarantee a wide range of securitized and other debt instruments, the equities markets fastidiously are listening to their chirps as indicative of the overall health. To a point, this is prudent, although it may be tricky to distinguish problems with the underlying collateral versus the liquidity squeeze currently faced by specialized bond insurers.

However, there is another broad consideration in reviewing the bond insurers. Because they are also so relevant and relied upon in so many other forms of bond financings, other than securitizations, a breakdown of the bond insurers could pose a domino collapse into other debt instruments, particularly municipal issuances. A loss of confidence might spread so quickly as to suck out liquidity from the broader debt markets.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, U.S. AND GLOBAL

The United States is no longer both the rudder and bow of the global economy. Other economies are becoming powerful drivers in their own right, and the US economy is relativized by rapidly expanding global growth. As long as the US economy and markets could more than offset trade imbalances by sucking in most of the world’s savings or excess liquidity, the transition would be painless, even deceptively kind.

Ultimately though, the US Dollar had to lose its exclusivity and standing, but how this would be reflected domestically, within the US remained to be determined. The US Federal Reserve was faced with contradictory alternatives. The option selected, wittingly or not, has placed the largest burden of transition upon the US wage earner. The proof was, on the one hand, in the relative reduced buying power, wages and savings of US workers while US based corporate enterprises reaped the full benefit of the global economic expansion. The average worker mostly benefited from made in China low cost socks at Wal-Mart while US corporate global giants share prices reflected the expansive advantage of globalization to them.

Maybe a bout of heightened inflation might have been more equitable and reflected in the US market both continued higher housing values and more quickly rising wages. That is not what happened, although the price of Chinese socks in Wal-Mart will inevitably rise.

What are the other implications, within the US and in global strategic considerations?

- US consumer will suffer further economic erosion.

- Americans, in percentages only rivaled by the Great Depression, will lose their homes. Today, though, this translates also into permanent stigmatization, credit branded, and denied access to job options, health insurance policies as well as future credit and home ownership.

- Will average Americans and their nervous political leaders seek scapegoats, abroad and within?

- Will European banks, Chinese labor or Arab oil bear the brunt of a new grudge?

- Will economic globalization become the “enemy” and political multilateralism become unrealizable when especially needed? Will America swerve into a new era of radical isolationism and restless interventionism?

- Will the Socio-economic divide become an unbridgeable abyss?

- Immigration could rise to the debate in another emotional context. New immigrants do not generally have credit histories, and no credit history is better than bad credit history. New immigrants, compared to the domestic born US underclass, will have a structural advantage, from competing for better jobs to ultimately realizing home ownership. How will such a reversal of fortune impact everything from assimilation and race relations to definitions of “patriotism” and xenophobia?

- Denied access to home ownership chronically, undermines not only the American dream, but also social cohesion and socially responsible behavior in an ever growing segment of Americans.

- Will the new American underclass be drawn into the web of more radical, exclusionary religiously oriented politics, especially among the “extreme Christian right?”

- European and international banks will be severely affected by the write downs. International institutions, from China to Europe, had come to favor the seemingly broad liquidity of these apparently conservative, longer duration AAA investments.

- A chilling effect may also deter European and other international lenders from continuing to provide greater access to and more liquidity for home ownership within their own domestic markets. This could be an unfortunate reversal of growing opportunity in traditionally more class structured societies. Innovations and the securitization of mortgage products have generally followed US market models. This already began during my tenure at Standard & Poor’s when we started to engage European experts and potential issuers in exploring development options. However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the US crumble experience has to or will translate into European and other housing markets. The macro, micro and psychological conditions differ significantly within each venue.

- US financial institutions will largely survive the experience, in significant part thanks to “sovereign funds” but how and for how long will they be traumatized?

- Will the role of sovereign funds translate into the new global economic arbitrators, and how could this further politicize economic decision making, within US as well as such source sovereigns?

- US home builders, at least many, may not survive, (or at least anywhere resembling historic levels as stubbornly massive inventories of new construction and existing homes remain to be sold off in an ever thinner market of buyers). Homebuilders were a traditional bulwark and critical, quality employer within the US economy.
 
- For how long will the problem reverberate, especially as refinancing and new mortgage options are sharply reduced to stretched out mortgagors who have otherwise managed to hang on to their homes.

- The global and US economy will feel a sustained impact in many industries as well as real estate in general. In commercial real estate, retail especially and office may suffer significantly while the impact will be less on the more stable and “less sexy” industrial, warehouse and distribution properties. Some speculate that multifamily could even benefit, but I’m more unconvinced. Businesses will broadly suffer, especially those serving the discretionary needs of a traumatized US home owner/consumer.

POTENTIAL OPTIONS TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE

As much as we might try, unfortunately there will be blood, of homeowners, lenders, builders and businesses in general. That is now unavoidable, and the bleeding is already more than a superficial wound. (As already noted, momentary swings in the equity markets are symptomatic rather than predictive). Nonetheless, there are options that should be considered, at least in terms of minimizing the depth and duration.

It is above my “pay-grade” to provide authoritative proposals, but…

- First, options to promptly reduce the immediate negative consequences and keep them from growing like a malignancy.

      
- The Fed rate cuts are welcome potentially enhancing liquidity. However, such cuts will not translate into liquidity unless the banks provide loans and under normal terms. Otherwise, the Fed cuts could become nothing more than subsidies for banks in respect of carry cost of existing loans on books.
 

- New commercial loan and mortgage terms are demanding or unattainable and interest rate “spreads” remain at levels still representing a hesitancy to venture with new credit.
 

- New regulatory edicts are already spilling into restrictive mortgage criteria. It is an impulsive reaction that could be counterproductive, dangerous. New regulations should be considered with the benefit of some distance and time. Political exhibitionism aside, such impulsive regulatory activism will not remedy past indulgences, but could be so overbearing as to critically exacerbate the trauma. When liquidity is needed and flexibility for current homeowners to refinance or sell, dramatically demanding changes will be counterproductive to immediate and longer term resolution.
 

- Expanding the definition of “conforming” for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools and increasing their regulatory capacity to purchase mortgages and issue new securities will add some needed stability and further liquidity.

 
- However, expanding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac capacity can in no way substitute for the role of the private issuer mortgage backed securities. The term “non-conforming” does not necessarily or even in the overwhelming instances translate to lower credit quality. In most cases it refers to specialized conditions including size and property type. The overwhelming majority of mortgages originated in the co-op gorges of Manhattan or the exclusive canyons of California will not qualify for “conforming.” Despite the most recent experience, real or rumored, the private issued mortgage backed securities have been at the forefront of meeting a range of valuable social and global objectives, from more equitable distribution of wealth through home ownership to better matching projected liabilities with assets of institutional investors. This is increasingly applicable in many maturing economies as well as the US.
 

- The infinite expansion of derivatives only comprehensible to a club whose membership can be counted on fingers and toes has undermined the general objective of bond ratings: instruments widely comprehensible on the basis of the rating. At some point, the dicing and slicing of mortgage pools and securities blurs the lines between rated and unrated classes, and complexity undermines liquidity based upon a standardized bond rating system. From my sources within, it seems that some carving into ever more complex derivatives may have been more motivated by the prospect of new banking fees rather than market demands. Regardless, “derivitization” begins to remind of a Hibachi stake chef slicing and dicing modest chunks of beef, chicken and seafood carved down to indistinguishable chunks, but with no protein added.
The bond insurers should be saved/bailed out. There is already a growing consensus in such direction even if government intervention is necessary. The risks of permanent loss are minimal, the main consideration appears to be liquidity and the bond insurers are relatively small in terms of capital. On the other hand, they have become oversized in their perceived foreshadowing of the problem. The bond insurers can continue to provide standardization to a wide variety of small and diverse credit worthy issues that, purely because of small size or complexity, might be closed out. The benefit of keeping them as ongoing enterprises far outweighs cost, only if to keep this canary singing in the current dim surrounding critical segments of the debt markets. Wall Street moves as a herd.

- Many current homeowners will need to see the possibility for a “fresh start” as they now may face insurmountable obstacles.
 

- Besides reviewing new regulatory options for mortgage lenders, banks and rating agencies over the longer term, there should also be consideration given to addressing the overbearing influence of credit agencies reporting on individuals. While “big brother” was always associated with an invasive government, the realization seems to have been manifested in an oligopoly of technically intrusive and assertive consumer credit agencies. It would now appear to be easier to wipe off a criminal conviction from official government records than overcome a bad credit rating rap. Such consumer credit ratings are decisive in access to jobs, insurance, education as well as home ownership and credit generally.
 

- US lawmakers should also reconsider recently adopted bankruptcy laws that are more restrictive and may perpetuate an ever increasing underclass still largely unheard but now especially bound to grow and be vocal.

 
- “Punish the greedy” who got us into this mess is an appealing and cheap response for the many “victims.” No reason not to review and potentially pursue civil and criminal action, putting aside that such frequently become show trials that destroy some while totally ignoring the culpability of many, (“Enron”).

However, the focus now should be on preserving home ownership dreams and realities, minimizing investor loss and avoiding the potentially unmanageable implications to global strategic chaos. For this reason, the “economic stimulus package” now under consideration by the White House and US Congress must include or be expanded to specifically alleviate the plight of homeowners. While the economy is now also vulnerable, the wider dangers will remain as long as home ownership is so broadly and deeply endangered.

Maybe the most intriguing question is: how should the US Federal Reserve evaluate inflation targets? The current Fed Chairman, in his previous life as an academic, has favored “inflation targeting” as a basis for Fed rate policy. The question still remains what should be the targets for the US, with really no firm historical landmarks? Should the US economy be viewed as mature or possibly transitional? Should transitional benchmarks resemble more developing rather than developed economies? How does the booming growth of the new economic giants impact the analysis of deciding inflation targets in the older economies, from US, Europe and Japan? Will there be a greater need for coordinated Central Bank action in the leading developed and developing economies?

Higher inflation could help bail out housing. It could also in longer term undermine it if interest rates spike and stick at higher levels. Central Bank monetary policy is not an exact science. We can study the risks of hyperinflation from before WWII, stagflation from three decades before or the Japanese experience with deflation or no-inflation which almost two decades later seems to be still traumatizing that economy. Regardless, an open mind addressing unprecedented circumstances is necessary. History is a lesson, but not a map.
 

Muhamed Sacirbey

--------------------

Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey holds B.A. degree in history and J. D. degree from Tulane University in New Orleans. He also holds M.B.A. degree from Columbia University. Prior to becoming Bosnia’s Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations, he practiced as an attorney in New York City and worked for several years as an investment banker. He presently writes his book “A Convenient Genocide, in a fishbowl ” and is a commentator on human rights and political issues.

--------------------