The European Courier in cooperation with Foreign Policy Association presents:

UNITED NATIONS’ EVOLUTION - April 13, 2008

- an interview with Amb. Christian Wenaweser, Vice-Chairman of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform, the head of the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations in New York City.

Watch video here.

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Sebastian Aulich: U.N. Security Council established the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is going to try people suspected of assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Why is this crime so important that a special tribunal had to be established and why cannot it be tried by the International Criminal Court?

Amb. Christian Wenaweser: Lebanon is not a state party to Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, so it does not have jurisdiction over the crime, which was committed in Lebanon. The Security Council decided that the crime of the assassination of former prime minister Hariri - but also other crimes, which had destabilizing effect on Lebanon - constituted threat to international security. That’s why the Security Council first established the commission and then the Tribunal.

SA: Is a special tribunal going to be established as well for the crimes committed in Darfur?

CW: No. The situation in Darfur has been referred to International Criminal Court by the Security Council. Security Council has the competence to do that under the Rome Statute and did so. Therefore there will be no need for a separate Tribunal to deal with Darfur issue.

SA: How do you think the international community should deal with Darfur crisis?

CW: This issue has been before the Security Council for a long time and certainly we support the actions the Security Council has taken. What is extremely frustrating is the pace, which decisions are being implemented with and the very slow improvement, if any, of the situation on the ground. We certainly believe that the Security Council track is the right one.

SA: So in your opinion the United Nations is doing enough to solve the Darfur crisis? Especially compared to its experience in Rwanda and Bosnia?

CW: There is political reality in the Security Council. If you had followed the discussions, you would be familiar with the difficulties in finding an agreement on Darfur. We will certainly be happy if the actions determined by the Council would show more result. But under the circumstances and especially given the prevailing dynamic between permanent members this is probably as good as it gets at this point.

SA: You are involved in work of Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform. What is your vision of the reformed Security Council? What should be done to make Security Council more effective?

CW: Right now, we are particularly active on the issue of working methods. That means in particular the involvement of states, that are not members, in the work of the Council. That is a very important concern to us because we are not a member, never actually have been in the history of our membership, and a lot of states are not members of the Council either. So that is one issue that is reviewed by us and that means especially to increase the access of non-members to the Council. We believe that it is very important that the Council talks to the states that are effected by what the Council debates. The practice today is such that it is very often not the case. So this is one aspect and for now the most important one. The other one is of course the enlargement. We don’t see very promising progress on this right now, but we certainly believe that the Council in its current composition does not reflect political reality.

SA: Is the Security Council in its current composition able to effectively deal with international crises?

CW: Well, when it is not, it is usually not a question of composition. There are number of impediments and one certainly is the fact that permanent members have veto. The power of veto has a strong influence on the discussions in the Security Council. Veto plays significant role not only when it is cast, what actually happens very rarely, but also what we use to call the threat of the veto. When you are siting at the table, negotiating with someone and you know that this person or party has a possibility to block the decision-making if they so choose, that of course has a very strong impact on the decision-making process.

SA: So the permanent members should not have the right to veto?

CW: I am not saying that. I am not an abolitionist and it is not our official position. We think veto is problematic and it would be good if the Security Council and the permanent members in particular came to some sort of agreement how to use the veto. Especially how not to use it. We do not think that the abolition of veto, which a lot of states ask for, is a practical proposition, because the permanent members are the ones, which can abolish the veto. The rest of the membership cannot just say that they want to get rid of the veto, unless the permanent five agrees, although we know they won’t. This is a matter of being pragmatic. We think it would be extremely useful if the permanent members sat together and developed a code of conduct what to do with the veto, when not to use it, or if that’s not possible that the individual states come out with similar proposition. You can come out tomorrow as a permanent member and say “I have to veto, I know it” and never got to use it again in the future. Or “I am not going to use it under such and such circumstances”. It would be immensely helpful.

SA: International Criminal Court promotes a concept of universal jurisdiction, however many countries, for example the United States, do not agree to this concept and never ratified the Rome Statute. Do you believe in universal jurisdiction?

CW: Of course and I also believe that the United States believes in universal jurisdiction. The U.S. believes in that in connection to genocide, for example. The main reason why the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute is not that they reject jurisdiction, certainly not, but they have other reasons for not joining the Court. I would argue that the principle of universal jurisdiction over genocide is pretty much generally agreed upon.

SA: Do you believe that the ICC can sustain and be effective without American support? Can it be a reliable international body without American support?

CW: It’s alive, you know. It’s working. The U.S. is not a state party. We would certainly hope that the U.S. joins the ICC but we also hope that a lot of other states that are not parties to the Rome Statute will do so in the near future. If you look at the position of the United States, I think it has evolved remarkably over the past few years because we had a very open opposition bordering on hostility from the U.S. a few years ago. However that is certainly not a position the U.S. is taking right now. So the U.S.’s position has evolved in a manner, which is very positive for the ICC and the peak of this development was that the Security Council did refer the Darfur situation to the ICC.

SA: Do you believe that the mandate of the ICTY should be expanded until Karadzic and Mladic are apprehended and tried?

CW: There is actually a decision, there is a closing strategy for the ICTY. There is, in a way, a plan to close down the ICTY. But I also think that it would be wrong to completely shut down the ICTY because of the two people you have mentioned. These two indictees play a prominent role for the credibility of the ICTY. The plan is not to shut it down completely but to have a very down-sized version of the ICTY, which can be reactivated for the purpose of conducting further trials.

SA: Recently, the UN Security Council sanctioned Iran for not complying with IAEA’s directives. How do you think the Iranian crisis should be dealt with?

CW: Through negotiations. It should be dealt through negotiations and the Security Council has a role to play there, but there should be also negotiations outside the Security Council and certainly IAEA needs to play essential role in there.

SA: If the economic sanctions are ineffective, should war be contemplated?

CW: No, we don’t think that. We don’t think it is a proposition that should be discusses right now.

SA: Let me change the topic. Can terrorism be combated by international law legislation? We have plenty of international treaties on terrorism, but still terrorism has not been eliminated or its threat limited. Can international law legislation be an effective tool in combating terrorism?

CW: Yes, it can, absolutely. But it cannot be the only tool. It’s very important to have treaties. We have thirteen treaties to deal with terrorism, some of them have been very effective and have been extremely useful in practical terms, but nobody will argue that having treaties on terrorism is all you need to combat terrorism. It is an important tool but you need to have other tools as well.

SA: So you believe the United Nations is addressing the terrorist threat properly? For example in respect to nuclear terrorism there is no directive, no special treaty, on how the fissile material should be stored, secured or monitored by the member states.

CW: That’s not quite accurate. There is a treaty that deals with nuclear terrorism. The fissile material issue is cut out of the treaty but is really a disarmament issue, it’s not a terrorism issue. In the terrorism area there is a treaty that deals with nuclear terrorism.

SA: Let me ask a question about the concept of pre-emptive war. Does it have grounds in international law? I am referring to the example of war in Iraq, which has been justified by the pre-emptive war theory.

CW: The UN Charter is a legal text, which regulates the use of force. We believe that the Charter is quite clear on this. You have two instances in which to use force legally. One is Article 51, which is “self-defense”, what is a well established principle. Second one is when the use of force is authorized by the Security Council. These are the only two instances where we believe the use of force is admissible in international law.

SA: There is a question of legality in respect to Kosovo’s independence. Some of the states say it is legal so they recognized Kosovo’s independence. Other states, for example Spain, say it is illegal. So what is the issue with it, is Kosovo’s independence legal or illegal in terms of international law?

CW: It is a difficult question because the main text the Security Council has adopted is a resolution 1244, which is based on the concept of territorial integrity of Serbia. It is a very difficult topic to decide. We do not think that the declaration of independence was in violation of international law.

SA: Was it a violation of resolution 1244 which reaffirms Serbia’s territorial integrity?

CW: We think it can be justified and reconciled with those provisions.

SA: What is the role of small countries, like Liechtenstein, in the United Nations system?

CW: For the small states the UN is a really great organization because you have principle of sovereign equality in the Charter, which is in large extent a practice at the UN. Of course not to 100%. The UN offers a unique platform for small states to present themselves to the rest of the world. In our case it is very obvious, we have very limited international presence in terms of diplomatic presences around the world. This is for us a place where to present ourselves to the world and have a possibility to communicate with everybody. That is a case for very large number of states. Small states, as defined informally to have population below 10 million people, make up the half of the membership of the UN. They are in a way important force over here, and I think that the history also shows that we have small states that take leadership in a number of issues, where it is more difficult for a medium-sized or a large state to play a decisive role. It is mutually beneficial relationship.

SA: Has the United Nations evolved in a sort of organization that is more focused on issues like climate change, poverty or children’s rights than on security matters, which are numerous around the world?

CW: The UN is not a security organization. Never was meant to be. It certainly has a strong peace and security component but it certainly has to deal with developments, with humanitarian cooperation, with human rights. The Charter already says that. Now we have witnessed evolution in the concept of what peace and security is. We deal with a lot of so called soft threats. Today if you take a look at the agenda of the Security Council you will see issues like those you mentioned. The climate change has been discussed at the Security Council as a phenomenon that can at least exacerbate threats to international peace and security. There are three pillars for the UN, which are development, peace and security, and human rights, what has to be treated at the same level.

 
 
  
Conducted in Manhattan on April 11, 2008