SREBRENICA TABOO - July 8, 2008
 

UNCA Briefing Advisory The July 1995 killing of an estimated 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in Srebrenica, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by the army of the Republika Srpska and a Serbian paramilitary unit known as the Scorpions, was declared a genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Srebrenica was a UN-declared safe area, protected by UN peacekeepers. But that did not prevent the massacre. A press conference will be held to discuss the tragic event and legal issues. WHO:                                                                      Ambassador Christian Wenaweser of the Principality of Lichtenstein Ambassador Diego Arria, former Permanent Representative of Venezuela Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey, former Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina Iman Bayram Mulic, IBNA WHEN: Friday, July 11, 2008, 3 pm WHERE: UNCA Club

Srebrenica was already an unmentionable subject at UN headquarters in New York City. Within the broader international diplomatic family talk about it reflected unease, as if speaking of a disgraced

relative. However, it is not Srebrenica that should bear the shame. The town and people already were suffering the consequences of being betrayed. Nonetheless, Srebrenica would be shunned so that others, global powers would not have to face the shame. There was no chance that Europe or the United States foreign policy apparatus would

support any United Nations investigation into the events of Srebrenica. Even in Sarajevo, any talk of Srebrenica was taboo. Only two years after Dayton, the foreign policy of Bosnia & Herzegovina was no longer its own. So when Bianca Jagger asked me, as Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Ambassador before the United Nations, to formally call for a UN

investigation, I knew that this effort would quickly

be buried, unless a strategy could be formulated to bring it out from the cloak of diplomatic suffocation.
 

ERASING AN OBLIGATION TO VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE

When Srebrenica was buried into Republika Srpska,

it was promptly forsaken by the multilateral institutions that had previously assumed the obligation to defend it. Perhaps it was faced with the precedent of so many other towns of BiH, Prijedor, Foca, Visegrad and many others that had become defined by a new reality of ethnic cleansing and redefinition. Once most of their non-Serb population had been expelled or murdered, the new rulers worked hard to erase the evidence of a previous existence, one lasting centuries. These towns were frequently renamed, and much of the international community appeared not so concerned or preoccupied with this, except for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, (ICTY).
 
Despite my opposition, as then BiH UN Ambassador, the “safe area” status of Srebrenica, Zepa and the other four similarly protected towns was promptly removed after the Dayton signatures. The Dayton Accords could have been effective in restoring Srebrenica and other areas where genocide was committed. Certainly the Dayton Accords could not erase the obligation of the international community. The last 13 years have evidenced that Srebrenica has not been restored, as is the situation with almost all other towns carved by ethnic cleansing in Republika Srpska.

Taking away the “safe area” status of Srebrenica and Zepa, (the other small town ethnically cleansed), has been premature. The United Nations and NATO cannot be relieved of their obligation by simply removing Srebrenica’s and Zepa’s status. That would only lapse once Srebrenica and Zepa were restored to their pre-genocide status. Removing the “safe area” status before restoring Srebrenica to its pre-genocide standing was not an option consistent with the responsibility and dignity associated with the leading multilateral institutions involved, including the UN and NATO.

A MURDERED TOWN SEEKING A CHAMPION

While still living, Srebrenica had earned several advocates. Ambassador Diego Arria had led a UN Security Council Mission to evaluate and aid the survival of the town.

UN and French General Philippe Morillon entered Srebrenica, and his professional reputation became intertwined with the survival of the town. The General’s underlying motives were irrelevant once he had wandered in amongst the refuges and town’s people crowded into this soon to be designated “safe area.” He could not afford to walk out on it, and, at least then, neither could France.

By 1995, Diego was no longer a diplomat at the United Nations having been relieved in large part for what some saw in his home country of Venezuela as a preoccupation with Bosnia & Herzegovina. General Morillion was back in France, and another French commander who followed him, General Bernard Janvier, was determined to free himself of what he saw as an untenable commitment to Srebrenica. The town was soon left exposed, and the massacres followed, whether such was anticipated or not by the US, UN and European bureaucrats who opted to leave the town naked to General Mladic and his Serbian marauders.

After the massacres, except for the efforts of Madeleine Albright to expose the killings, the multilateral institutions, particularly the UN and NATO, rushed to relieve themselves of their obligation toward Srebrenica by taking away its “safe area” status. The town seemed to fade from sight or memory, except in the eyes of the forensic experts, the ICTY and the victims.

Bianca Jagger had frequently traveled to Bosnia & Herzegovina during the war and brought some children to the US for emergency medical treatment. In a couple of cases, we shared the responsibility, and I even had to assume legal adoption in order to authorize treatment. One young girl did not make it out of Bosnia & Herzegovina and another young boy died on the operating table in New York. It was war, and maybe we should measure our success in the lives saved rather than those lost. Several young children we helped then have realized lives possibly otherwise lost.

Bianca maintained a shared concern for those that had been victimized. When she asked to speak to me regarding Srebrenica I understood that perhaps she was the last champion of a murdered town that most wanted to forget, including in Sarajevo, if not to bury hidden deals, then at least for the convenience of not confronting rapidly rising revisionist authority.

THE BOSNIAN AMBASSADOR WAS NOT ALLOWED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF SREBRENICA

After the Dayton Accords, there was a rush to bring Republika Srpska officials into the Government and institutions of Bosnia & Herzegovina. This would presumably convey the perception of the Accords being successfully implemented, and the triumph of the strategy of the “Contact Group,” (US, UK, France, Germany and Russia), in bringing an end to conflict in Southeast Europe. However, by 1998 the implementation of the Dayton Accords had already been largely one-sided: Republika Srpska officials into BiH institutions while few ethnically cleansed refugees were returning to a Republika Srpska, still unwelcoming to non-Serbs and committed to ethnic homogeneity.

When Bianca Jagger came to see me that summer of 1998, I knew that any initiative by Bosnia & Herzegovina representatives to the United Nations to investigate Srebrenica would be blocked by Republika Srpska officials within the BiH Foreign Ministry and Government. The Security Council permanent powers were also opposed to reopening of any issue related to BiH, and especially Srebrenica. The Secretary General in the face of such resistance, certainly was no more inclined toward such an independent investigation, even if there was a similar precedent for Rwanda. The request for a UN investigation seemed to be at a dead end before it was ever initiated. Further, it would bring me into conflict with officials from the “big powers” at the UN not anxious for such investigation, as well as Srpska representatives within the BiH Government.

However, there was one option that might succeed even if unprecedented: The UN General Assembly, representing all the member states, would request that the Secretary General undertake the investigation. There was every year a debate and resolution within the General Assembly on: “the Situation in Bosnia & Herzegovina.” Still though, as BiH’s Permanent Representative to the UN, I would be blocked from supporting such investigation. It would be awkward for such resolution to proceed, without the formal support of the BiH Ambassador. To overcome, we worked to secure for the resolution and investigation the support, “sponsorship” of HRH Prince Zeid of Jordan and then Ambassador Danilo Turk of Slovenia, (now President of Slovenia).

THREATS NOT TO PURSUE INVESTIGATION INTO SREBRENICA

The Representatives of the Permanent Five in the UN Security Council, (US, UK, France, Russia and China), and others challenged my support for this resolution and investigation on the basis that I was not authorized by Sarajevo to sponsor or support such. They presumed to know my diplomatic instructions better than I did, and they of course did. Regardless though, as Representative of BiH, I was not providing formal sponsorship or support. Rather, Jordan, Slovenia and several other states would urge for the investigation knowing that the Bosnian Ambassador was formally blocked, but informally fully behind the effort.

Some of the big powers tried to obstruct the effort by pressuring Bosnian officials, including then President Alija Izetbegovic to prevent me from moving ahead with the General Assembly Resolution and investigation request. (I had also received warnings, or more accurately threats from similar sources). President Izetbegovic telephoned and asked me if I wanted to really carry through with this request for the Srebrenica investigation. Srebrenica was a subject that most avoided, in the least because most sponsors of the Dayton Accords made it taboo. My response was that I believed it was part of our political, legal and moral responsibility, and that we had no option despite the threats from the “big powers.” President Izetbegovic was silent for a moment. Then he replied: “You are probably going to be bringing upon yourself a whole lot of trouble, but you have my blessing.”

The Resolution was adopted, despite significant efforts to first enfeeble and then to outright block its adoption. From Lichtenstein to Malaysian representatives, the resolution and investigation was understood to embody a critical step and precedent for the United Nations and multilateralism. (The Republic of Georgia recently relied upon this precedent to instigate an investigation regarding violations of its sovereignty and territorial integrity by Russia). In the end, as I could not explicitly advocate the resolution, most could not openly oppose an investigation by the Secretary General into Srebrenica.

ACCOUNTABILITY STILL SOUGHT

The Resolution requested that the Secretary General provide the report within nine months. The timeframe was extended on several occasions. Ambassador Turk, Prince Zeid, Bianca, others and I endeavored to meet regularly with the investigators and provide assistance and initiative. The “big powers” exerted their influence, including edit prerogatives. The final Srebrenica report had passed through several capitals and Foreign Ministries by the time it was issued.

While the report was sanitized to avoid recognition of the full responsibility of some leading capitals and officials, it was nonetheless a step to create a methodology toward transparency and accountability. The two main authors of the report probably can provide further insight into what of their original analysis, evidence and conclusions was erased. Still, as noted, the “Srebrenica Report” has served as a precedent. Ironically though, Srebrenica has been least impacted by the efforts undertaken within the UN General Assembly in 1998. Perhaps it was the sanitization of the report or simply that many facts had not yet reached light 10 years earlier. (From recent revelations from Florence Hartmann and others, Srebrenica betrayal is ever more apparent). Maybe the ICTY and ICJ judgments have provided a fresh legal and evidentiary perspective. Regardless, Srebrenica is still owed accountability.

Muhamed Sacirbey

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Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey holds B.A. degree in history and J. D. degree from Tulane University in New Orleans. He also holds M.B.A. degree from Columbia University. Prior to becoming Bosnia’s Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations, he practiced as an attorney in New York City and worked for several years as an investment banker. He presently writes his book “A Convenient Genocide, in a fishbowl ” and is a commentator on human rights and political issues.

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